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INTRODUCTION
We tend to think about how companies threaten individual
privacy by examining their data-handling policies at frozen
moments in time. At a given moment, so the typical reasoning
goes, a company may collect too much information about its us1
ers, enabling it to compile rich digital dossiers. It may do too
little to protect this information, exposing secrets to hackers
2
and unscrupulous employees. It may store information for a
3
much longer time than it has a need to keep it.

1. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY
IN THE INFORMATION AGE 1–10 (2004) [hereinafter SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON].
2. Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public
and Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241,
251–55 (2007).
3. Christopher Soghoian, An End to Privacy Theater: Exposing and Discouraging Corporate Disclosure of User Data to the Government, 12 MINN. J. L.
SCI. & TECH. 191, 209–15 (2011) (summarizing data retention policies for websites, Internet providers, and telecommunications companies).
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This Article reconsiders problems like these within a more
dynamic framework, putting frozen moments of time into motion and shifting the focus to the topic of change. What happens
when companies rewrite long-established ground rules governing the way they handle data about their users? There is value
in studying as a distinct privacy problem the sudden privacy
4
shift, which some have called the “privacy lurch.” Users who
experience privacy lurches find themselves exposed to distinct
harms that policymakers can counter with tailored remedies,
solutions which are easy to miss when change is not in focus.
This is a timely subject for study, as significant new privacy lurches have become an increasingly common phenomenon.
In March 2012, Google tore down the walls that once separated
databases tracking user behavior across its services, letting it
correlate for the first time, for example, a user’s calendar ap5
pointments with her search queries. In 2008, broadband cable
Internet providers began testing systems that would have allowed them to watch their users’ web surfing habits much more
6
than they had in the past, in order to sell targeted advertising.
Over the past few years, Facebook has incrementally shifted its
default settings from providing robust privacy to allowing pub7
lic scrutiny of its users’ personal information.
Privacy lurches like these disrupt long-settled expectations. They foist new ground rules upon millions of users whose
8
attention spans have long since waned. Lurches give lie to the
model of the informed user and contradict company claims of
meaningful user consent premised on far-fetched theories of the
evolving nature of online contracts. They expose to great harm
individuals who do not understand the way that the information collected about them has been put to new, invasive us-

4. James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1200–
01 (2009).
5. Alma Whitten, Updating Our Privacy Policies and Terms of Service,
GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG (Jan. 24, 2012), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2012/
01/updating-our-privacy-policies-and-terms.html.
6. Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1432–38 [hereinafter Ohm, Rise and Fall].
7. See infra Part I.B.3.
8. See Rob Weatherhead, Say It Quick, Say It Well—The Attention Span
of a Modern Internet User, GUARDIAN (Mar. 19, 2012, 3:52 PM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media-network/media-networkblog/2012/mar/19/
attention-span-internet-consumer (describing the distractibility of the average
Internet user).
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es. They deprive their users the free choice to decide whether
the value of a service justifies the tradeoff to personal privacy,
particularly when the user feels locked in to a specific provider
because of the time and energy he has already invested (think
social networks) or the lack of meaningful competition (think
10
broadband Internet service or Internet search).
But despite the many problems with privacy lurches, some
might argue we should do nothing to limit them. Privacy lurches are products of a dynamic marketplace for online goods and
11
services. What I call a lurch, the media instead tends to mythologize as a “pivot,” a shift in a company’s business model
celebrated as proof of the nimble, entrepreneurial dynamism
12
that has become a hallmark of our information economy. Before we intervene against the harms of privacy lurches, we need
to consider what we might give up in return.
To help balance the advantages of the dynamic marketplace with the harms of privacy lurches, this Article prescribes
a new twist on old notice-and-choice solutions. This is admittedly an out-of-fashion approach to information privacy, as
13
many have lost faith in notice-and-choice. Scholars have described how notice suffers, particularly on the web, from fundamental information-quality problems; we are awash in a sea
of lengthy privacy policies that we cannot take the time to read,

9. Cory Doctorow, The Curious Case of Internet Privacy, TECH. REV.
(June 6, 2012), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/428045/the-curious
-case-of-internet-privacy/.
10. See Woodrow Hartzog, Web Design as Contract, 60 AM. U. L. REV.
1635, 1650–53 (2011) (explaining the inadequacy of online privacy policies for
eliciting consent).
11. FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC STAFF REPORT: SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING 40 (2009) [hereinafter FTC,
ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/
02/P085400behavadreport.pdf (“[A] business may have a legitimate need to
change its privacy policy from time to time, especially in the dynamic online
marketplace.”).
12. See infra Part I.A.
13. E.g., Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the
Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1392–402 (2000) (critiquing arguments for privacy as choice); Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State,
32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 821–28 (2000) (critiquing arguments for privacy as control); see also N.Y. Times Editors, An Interview with David Vladeck of the
F.T.C., MEDIA DECODER BLOG (Aug. 5, 2009, 2:24 PM), http://mediadecoder
.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/05/an-interview-with-david-vladeck-of-the-ftc/ (describing the search for a new framework for protecting privacy beyond noticeand-choice by the new head of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection).
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written by sophisticated parties with an incentive to hide the
14
worst parts.
To breathe a little life back into notice-and-choice, this Article looks to brands and trademarks, representing a novel integration of two very important but until now rarely connected
15
areas of information policy. Trademark laws recognize how
certain words and symbols in the marketplace tackle the very
same information quality and consumer protection concerns
that animate notice-and-choice debates in privacy law. Scholars
who study marketing, branding, and trademark theory describe
the unique informational power of trademarks, service marks,
and, more generally, brands to signal quality and goodwill to
16
consumers concisely and unambiguously. Trademark scholars
describe how brands can serve to punish and warn, helping
consumers recognize a company with a track record of shoddy
17
practices or weak attention to consumer protection.
This Article proposes that we use the information qualities
of trademarks to meet the notice deficiencies of privacy law. It
recommends that lawmakers and regulators force almost every
company that handles customer information to bind its brand
14. E.g., Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, What Can Behavioral
Economics Teach Us About Privacy?, in DIGITAL PRIVACY: THEORY, TECHNOLOGIES, AND PRACTICES 363, 363–64 (Alessandro Acquisti et al. eds., 2008); M.
Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1027, 1050–55 (2012).
15. Scholars have compared online privacy to different aspects of the
broader field of unfair competition law, within which trademark law is situated. Many, for example, have written about the common law right of publicity,
which straddles the two areas. See generally, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A.
Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58
STAN. L. REV. 1161 (2006); Laura A. Heymann, The Law of Reputation and the
Interest of the Audience, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1341 (2011). Others have noted how
particular trademark or unfair competition remedies may impinge on personal
privacy or vice versa. See generally, e.g., Alberto J. Cerda Silva, Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights by Diminishing Privacy: How the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement Jeopardizes the Right to Privacy, 26 AM. U.
INT’L L. REV. 601 (2011). Still others have looked at particular developments
that have put pressure on both trademark and privacy law. See generally, e.g.,
William McGeveran, Disclosure, Endorsement, and Identity in Social Marketing, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1105; James Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search
Engine Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2007). But none of these articles analyzes the
ways in which the theoretical underpinnings of trademark law can be used as
a tool to correct the fundamental flaws in notice-and-choice solutions, the most
prominent tools used to ensure privacy.
16. See generally Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law,
51 UCLA L. REV. 621 (2004).
17. See generally Note, Badwill, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1845 (2003).
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name to a fully specified set of core privacy commitments. The
name “Facebook,” for example, should be inextricably bound to
that company’s specific, fundamental promises about the
amount of information it collects and the uses to which it puts
that information. If the company chooses someday to depart
from these initial core privacy commitments, it must choose a
new name to describe its modified service, albeit perhaps one
associated with the old name, such as “Facebook Plus” or “Facebook Enhanced.”
Although this “branded privacy” solution is novel, it is wellsupported by the theoretical underpinnings of both privacy law
and trademark law. It builds on the work of privacy scholars
19
who have looked to consumer protection law for guidance.
Just as companies selling inherently dangerous products are
20
obligated to attach warning labels, so too should companies
shifting privacy practices in inherently dangerous, expectation21
defeating ways be required to warn their customers. And the
spot at the top of every Internet web page displaying the brand
name may be the best available space for an effective warning
label online.
Branded privacy finds little direct support from traditional
trademark theory, which focuses almost exclusively on the
source-identifying role of trademarks, but it is well supported
by other aspects of trademark theory and doctrine, which emphasize the connection between trademarks and quality control. It finds even stronger support from the recent work of a
group of scholars—who have never before been identified as a
separate scholarly “movement,” and whom I am giving the
moniker “the New Trademark” scholars—who reconceptualize
trademarks as swords used on behalf of consumers rather than
22
merely as shields used to defend producers.
At the same time, this solution strikes a balance between
the positive aspects of dynamism and the negative harms of
18. “Almost” because a few carve outs are recommended for very new
companies still actively experimenting with business models. See infra Part
III.E.
19. See generally James Grimmelmann, Privacy as Product Safety, 19
WIDENER L.J. 793 (2010) (discussing product safety laws and privacy in social
media).
20. See infra Part III.A.1.
21. See Grimmelmann, supra note 4, at 1202 (“That unannounced design
change made both Facebook and its partner sites unreasonably dangerous
services.”).
22. See infra Part III.A.2.c.
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privacy lurches. It leaves room for market actors to innovate by
focusing on fixing information-quality problems during privacy
lurches rather than prohibiting them outright, and by restricting mandatory rebranding only to situations involving a narrow
class of privacy promises. Companies will be free to evolve and
adapt their practices in any way that does not tread upon their
core privacy commitments, but they could abandon a core commitment only by changing their brand. This rule will act like a
brake, forcing companies to stop and consider the class of
choices consumers care about most, without preventing dynamism unrelated to those choices. And when companies do
choose to modify a core privacy commitment, their new brands
will send clear, unambiguous signals to consumers and privacy
watchdogs that something important has changed.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the
problem with privacy lurches, giving examples of recent lurches
and elaborating the special harms (and risks of harm) that privacy lurches cause. Part II outlines what must be done to deal
with the problem of privacy lurches, identifying the shortcomings of solutions proposed by others, and embracing notice-andchoice solutions that improve the information-quality problems
that plague most alternatives. Part II then shows how trademark and brand theories have addressed very similar information-quality problems. Finally, Part III develops the branded
privacy solution, explains its virtues, offers variations to
strengthen or weaken its effects as situations demand, discusses what legal reforms are needed to implement the idea, and
responds to anticipated critiques.
I. PIVOTS AND PRIVACY LURCHES
A. THE PIVOT
Consider the “pivot.” Although the word and the idea probably pre-date the use by entrepreneur Eric Ries, they are most
23
often said to have been popularized with him, his blog, and
24
his book, The Lean Startup. Ries defines a pivot as “the idea
that successful startups change directions but stay grounded in

23. Eric Ries, STARTUP LESSONS LEARNED
.startuplessonslearned.com/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2012).
24. ERIC RIES, THE LEAN STARTUP (2011).

BLOG,

http://www
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what they’ve learned.” Pivots have happened for as long as we
have had companies, but both their incidence and their importance have increased as business models shift to the Internet, which itself changes so quickly as to obsolete business
26
models before a company gets off the ground.
Pivots have become part of a new dynamic marketplace for
online services. In this new world, a start-up that fails brings
no shame to its founders and investors, so long as it “fail[s]
27
gracefully.” Ries himself argues that “[f]ailure is a prerequi28
site to learning.” Software pioneer Mitch Kapor estimates that
29
“roughly 15 to 20 percent” of the companies he funds through
his start-up investment fund “have gone through radical trans30
formations.”
In fact, the pivot has been valorized as a sign that founders
31
are trying to harness the engine of creative destruction. Many
bloggers and writers in the trade press recite with great admiration the now-enormous companies that once pivoted: Flickr
32
“started out as a feature of an online game” and PayPal “was
focused on the idea of beaming money between hand-held digi33
tal assistants.” The customer-facing music recommendation
service Pandora started as a service aimed at businesses like
34
AOL and Yahoo!.
Pivots are seen as a continuation of the dot-com-boom-era
maxim that sophisticated investors invest in people and not
35
their ideas. The difference today, according to pivot propo-

25. Eric Ries, Pivot, Don’t Jump to a New Vision, STARTUP LESSONS
LEARNED BLOG (June 22, 2009), http://www.startuplessonslearned.com/2009/
06/pivot-dont-jump-to-new-vision.html.
26. Jenna Wortham, In Tech, Starting Up by Failing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18,
2012, at B1.
27. Id.; Steve Lohr, With a Leaner Model, Start-Ups Reach Further Afield,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2011, at D3.
28. RIES, supra note 24, at 154.
29. Wortham, supra note 26, at B6.
30. Id.
31. See JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY
81–86 (1942).
32. Wortham, supra note 26, at B6.
33. Id.
34. Tom Grasty, The Difference Between a ‘Pivot’ and a ‘Reboot’, IDEA LAB
BLOG (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.pbs.org/idealab/2012/02/the-difference
-between-a-pivot-and-a-reboot048.html.
35. Investing in Start-ups: The Pivotal Moment, ECONOMIST, Dec. 4, 2010,
at 84.
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nents, is the falling cost of starting an online business. This
has given rise to “a remarkable increase in the degree of entre37
preneurial experimentation.”
As a key component of the success of tech startups in Silicon Valley, the pivot thus becomes a central part of the operation of our entire economy. The Obama Administration touts
entrepreneurs whenever it discusses its agenda for strengthen38
ing the economy and creating jobs. The administration
launched a broad initiative it calls “Startup America,” intended
to “celebrate, inspire, and accelerate high-growth entrepre39
neurship throughout the nation.” In the just-completed election cycle, Republican candidates who sought to replace the
President talked a lot about start-up entrepreneurship on the
40
campaign trail. Pivots fuel entrepreneurship, which seems to
be the only engine of the economy that still functions properly.
Who could possibly say anything bad about them?
B. PRIVACY LURCHES
But nimble pivots and corporate dynamism can also harm
individual privacy. Companies that pivot after amassing large
databases full of information about individual users too often
choose to use the information in new ways, reneging on express
and implied promises made when those users first signed up.
Often these pivots fit under the subcategory of “monetization”
strategies, a dressed-up way to describe methods for converting
41
user secrets into cash. These “privacy lurches” can be deeply
disruptive to settled expectations and often leave users feeling
36. Id.
37. Id. (quoting Bill Sahlman of Harvard Business School).
38. Fact Sheet: White House Launches “Startup America” Initiative,
WHITEHOUSE.GOV,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/startup-america-fact-sheet
(last visited Nov. 28, 2012).
39. Id.
40. See Mitt Romney, Former Mass. Governor, Florida Republican Primary Speech (Jan. 31, 2012), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
election-2012/post/mitt-romneys-florida-republican-primary-speech-full-text/
2012/01/31/gIQA8tYKgQ_blog.html (“My vision for free enterprise is to return
entrepreneurship to the genius and creativity of the American people . . . . I
will make America the most attractive place in the world for entrepreneurs,
for innovators, and for job creators.”).
41. Martin Zwilling, Top 10 Ways Entrepreneurs Pivot a Lean Startup,
FORBES (Sept. 16, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
martinzwilling/2011/09/16/top-10-ways-entrepreneurs-pivot-a-lean-startup/
(listing ten types of pivots including, at number seven, the “value capture pivot,” referring to the “monetization or revenue model”).
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trapped between bad choices: tolerate significantly less privacy
or abandon a service in which they have invested time, energy,
and social effort. Privacy lurches are significant and special
privacy problems that deserve tailored solutions, described further below. But first, consider three prominent recent examples.
1. Google’s 2012 Privacy Policy Transformation
In January 2012, Google announced it was making signifi42
cant changes to its many privacy policies. Most importantly, it
consolidated most of the “more than 70” privacy policies it had
previously scattered across its various products into a single,
43
omnibus privacy policy.
The announcement inspired a deluge of commentary, much
44
45
of it critical but some supportive. Many observers focused on
the most important substantive shift announced, that Google
would begin combining data about its users across services that
46
historically it had kept separate. The company described this
change as a boon for users, praising “the cool things Google can
47
do when we combine information across products.” As an example, it crowed that “[w]e can provide reminders that you’re
going to be late for a meeting based on your location, your calendar and an understanding of what the traffic is like that day.
Or ensure that our spelling suggestions, even for your friends’
48
names, are accurate because you’ve typed them before.”
Some were less enthused. The Center for Digital Democra49
cy charged Google with “a failure to be candid with users,”
and for violating a consent decree it had entered into with the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 2011 promising reformed
42. Whitten, supra note 5.
43. Id.
44. Jon Brodkin, Google Privacy Change Taking Effect Today Is Illegal,
EU Officials Say, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 1, 2012, 11:45 AM), http://arstechnica
.com/tech-policy/2012/03/google-privacy-change-taking-effect-today-is-illegal
-eu-officials-say/ (summarizing concerns by regulators and privacy activists).
45. Matt Rosoff, The Panic over Google’s New Privacy Rules Is Ridiculous,
BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 25, 2012, 2:22 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the
-panic-over-googles-new-privacy-rules-is-ridiculous-2012-1.
46. Id.
47. Whitten, supra note 5.
48. Id.
49. Demedia, FTC Should Halt Google Privacy Changes, as Violation of
Consent Decree, CENTER FOR DIGITAL DEMOCRACY (Feb. 10, 2012, 3:31 PM),
http://www.democraticmedia.org/ftc-should-halt-google-privacy-changes
-violation-consent-decree.
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50

privacy practices. Similarly, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) sued the FTC in federal court to compel
the agency to block the consolidation of user data, accusing the
FTC of “placing the privacy interests of literally hundreds of
51
millions [of] Internet users at grave risk” by failing to act. A
judge dismissed the suit as an attack on a non-reviewable
agency action, but only after expressing the opinion that the
complaint “advanced serious concerns that may well be legiti52
mate.”
Regulators expressed similar concerns. Eight members of
the House of Representatives sent Google executives a request
53
for more information. One of the most vocal was Representative Ed Markey, who released a statement complaining that
“[s]haring users’ personal information across its products may
make good business sense for Google, but it undermines priva54
cy safeguards for consumers.” State officials, through the National Association of Attorneys General, sent a letter focusing
55
on the lack of an opportunity to opt out of the pooling of data.
European regulators concurred. Several national dataprotection authorities from countries across Europe asked
56
Google to delay implementing its planned changes. At the
same time, they asked one of their ranks, the French regulator
57
CNIL, to open an investigation into the shift.

50. Id.
51. Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 3, Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. FTC,
2012 WL 413966 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 2012) (No. 1:12-cv-00206).
52. Memorandum Opinion at 11, Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. FTC (D.D.C.
Feb. 24, 2012) (No. 1:12-cv-00206), available at https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/
cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2012cv0206-12.
53. Letter from Congressman Ed Markey et al. to Larry Page, Chief Exec.
Officer, Google (Jan. 26, 2012), available at http://markey.house.gov/sites/
markey.house.gov/files/documents/2012_0126.Google%20Prviacy%20Letter.
pdf.
54. Katy Bachman, Pols to Google: Wrong Answers, ADWEEK (Jan. 31,
2012), available at http://www.adweek.com/news/technology/pols-google
-wrong-answers-137911.
55. Nat’l Ass’n of Attorneys Gen., Attorneys General Express Concerns
over Google’s Privacy Policy, NAAG NEWS BLOG (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www
.naag.org/attorneys-general-express-concerns-over-googles-privacy-policy
-attorneys-general-express-concerns-over-googles-privacy-policy.php.
56. James Kanter, E.U. Presses Google to Delay Privacy Policy Changes,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2012, at B3.
57. Id.
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2. NebuAd and Phorm
Telephone and cable television companies launched broadband Internet service at the end of the 1990s, utilizing a feefor-access business model, charging subscribers a monthly fee
58
to be connected to all online services. This business model
gave the broadband providers no incentive to intrude into subscriber privacy, and they restricted their scrutiny of customer
behavior to limited circumstances involving the protection of
59
the security of their networks.
During the first decade of the twenty-first century, several
competitive and technological shifts altered these incentives.
Broadband providers found themselves under constant pressure to improve their infrastructure in order to deliver greater
bandwidth, to keep up with data-hungry applications like
60
streaming video and voice telephony. They also eyed jealously
Google’s ascension, which was based almost entirely on sales of
61
advertising tied contextually to a user’s online behavior. In
2008, start-up companies began approaching the broadband
providers promising new technologies they could use to com62
pete with Google’s ability to trade user secrets for cash.
Two companies in particular, NebuAd and Phorm, began to
63
market very similar services. They asked providers to install
systems that would peer, at least a little, into the web surfing
habits of their subscribers, allowing them to build profiles of
each subscriber’s online activities, using so-called deep-packet
64
inspection technology. The NebuAd and Phorm systems would
know, for example, that subscriber A frequented travel web65
sites while subscriber B bought shoes online. These profiles
could then be sold to advertisers, who would deliver ads directly to a user’s desktop, again using NebuAd and Phorm technol66
ogies.
58. Internet Service Provider (ISP)–History and Development, FREE ENECOMMERCE, http://ecommerce.hostip.info/pages/623/Internet
-Service-Provider-ISP-HISTORY-DEVELOPMENT.html (last visited Nov. 28,
2012); see also Ohm, Rise and Fall supra note 6, at 1429–30 (describing the
dawn of the commercial Internet).
59. See Ohm, Rise and Fall, supra note 6, at 1425–28.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1426.
62. See id. at 1432–35.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See id.
CYCLOPEDIA OF
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Phorm focused most of its attention on providers in the
United Kingdom, while NebuAd concentrated on the U.S. market, but in both countries, the responses were the same: fear,
67
outrage, and regulatory scrutiny. The UK’s Information
Commissioner strongly hinted that Phorm should offer the ser68
vice only on an opt-in basis. U.S. congressmen held numerous
hearings and wrote letters to broadband providers (mostly ca69
ble operators) who had entered into contracts with NebuAd.
70
State Attorneys General conducted parallel investigations. In
the end, NebuAd’s and Phorm’s provider partners began to
abandon them. Today, NebuAd no longer exists, and Phorm has
shifted its focus to other countries, including Brazil and Chi71
na.
3. A Slow-Moving Lurch: Facebook’s Shift from Private to
Public
The hallmark of the lurches described so far is the suddenness of the large shift. In every case, a long-established incumbent player with millions of customers (and in almost every example, with a significant market share) instituted a dramatic
change in the way it handled user information, virtually overnight. Another very important privacy lurch has happened
much more slowly, although for that reason calling it a lurch
does some violence to language. Facebook has steadily, slowly
transformed itself from a very private social network into a
nearly public one.
Although we can measure where Facebook falls along a
continuum of private to public in many ways, using many metrics, consider one especially important measure: the degree of
67. See id.
68. Id.
69. See id.; see also Nate Anderson, Congress Goes After NebuAd . . .
Again, ARS TECHNICA (July 15, 2008, 10:49 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech
-policy/2008/07/congress-goes-after-nebuad-again/; Nate Anderson, NebuAd
Mess Leads Big ISPs to Call for “Opt-in” Ad Targeting, ARS TECHNICA (Sept.
25, 2008, 8:54 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy-2008/09/nebuad-mess
-leads-big-isps-to-call-for-opt-in-ad-targeting/.
70. See Ohm, Rise and Fall, supra note 6, at 1435 (referencing the action
of the Connecticut Attorney General).
71. See Wendy Davis, Case Closed: NebuAd Shuts Down, MEDIAPOST
PUBLICATIONS (May 18, 2009, 4:21 PM), http://www.mediapost.com/
publications/article/106277/; Glyn Moody, Phorm Still Looking for a Large
-Scale Deployment, Still Finding Investors, TECHDIRT (Nov. 4, 2011, 2:42 PM),
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20111103/10133616623/phorm-still-looking
-large-scale-deployment-still-finding-investors.shtml.
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accessibility of the facts that Facebook users submit to people
other than “Friends” and “Friends of Friends.” In other words,
how much can Facebook user A, who is not part of Facebook
user B’s extended social network, know about B? And even
more importantly, how much can a non-Facebook user know
about people using Facebook?
As anybody who has seen the movie knows, Facebook be72
gan as an exclusive service. Only college students at certain
elite colleges were given access to the network, and people on
the outside had almost no visibility to what was happening in73
side. But over time, Facebook has tried to invert itself, switch74
ing from a mostly private to a mostly public service. Consider
the information found on the Facebook profile page—picture,
gender, city, personal interests. In the beginning, none of this
75
information was available outside the network by default.
Most importantly, this meant that Google’s search engine spider could not harvest information about Facebook users, mean76
ing search queries for names never returned Facebook results.
In July 2009, perhaps to compete with Twitter, a service
77
that has been intrinsically public from birth, Facebook flipped
the default, making what the company called “Basic Info”—
photo, gender, hometown, current city, and biography—for the
78
first time visible to the world at large. Users could opt out of
sharing some pieces of basic info, by navigating Facebook’s famously complex privacy settings. But many fields—including
name, picture, city, gender, networks, and fan pages—were no
79
longer subject to hiding.
72. THE SOCIAL NETWORK (Columbia Pictures 2010).
73. See Kurt Opsahl, Facebook’s Eroding Privacy Policy: A Timeline,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. DEEPLINKS BLOG (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www
.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/04/facebook-timeline.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Chad Skelton, New Facebook Privacy Settings Make Your Private Photos Public, VANCOUVER SUN (Dec. 10, 2009, 8:59 AM), http://communities
.canada.com/vancouversun/blogs/parenting/archive/2009/12/10/facebookprivacy-settings-profile.aspx (speculating changes were made to compete with
Twitter); see also Erick Schonfeld, Facebook’s Response to Twitter,
TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 4, 2009), http://techcrunch.com/2009/03/04/facebooks
-response-to-twitter/.
78. See Chris Kelly, Improving Sharing Through Control, Simplicity and
Connection, FACEBOOK BLOG (July 1, 2009, 1:11 PM), https://blog
.facebook.com/blog.php?post=101470352130.
79. Kevin Bankston, Facebook’s New Privacy Changes: The Good, the Bad,
and the Ugly, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. DEEPLINKS BLOG (Dec. 9, 2009),
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Pulling back the lens a bit, the major shift in 2009 constituted but a single step in a much longer series transforming
Facebook from a private to a public service. Facebook has instantiated its policies in software but revealed them in its written privacy policies, allowing commentators to mark their evolution. Kurt Opsahl of the Electronic Frontier Foundation
summarized this trend in a blog post, comparing six successive
80
versions of the document. In 2005, the privacy policy promised
that: “No personal information that you submit to Thefacebook
will be available to any user of the Web Site who does not belong to at least one of the groups specified by you in your priva81
cy settings.” By 2007, this had shifted to: “Your name, school
name, and profile picture thumbnail will be available in search
results across the Facebook network unless you alter your pri82
vacy settings.” And by 2009, this had shifted yet again to:
“Certain categories of information such as your name, profile
photo, list of friends and pages you are a fan of, gender, geographic region, and networks you belong to are considered publicly available to everyone, including Facebook-enhanced appli83
cations, and therefore do not have privacy settings.”
Perceiving Facebook’s fundamental privacy lurch requires
one to take a longer temporal view. At each step, Facebook exposed to public view a little more information from a user’s pro84
file page than it had before. Taken individually, these steps
might seem like small shifts to the status quo, but when viewed
across a still-relatively-compact set of five years, the radical
sum shift is unmistakable.
As in the other examples, Facebook’s privacy lurch was
criticized by consumers and privacy watchdogs and investigated by regulators. In 2011, the FTC filed charges against the
85
company. The two parties settled the charges late in 2011

http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/12/facebooks-new-privacy-changes-good
-bad-and-ugly.
80. Opsahl, supra note 73.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. For a fine visualization of Facebook’s slow transformation from private to public, see Matt McKeon, The Evolution of Privacy on Facebook,
MATTMCKEON.COM, http://mattmckeon.com/facebook-privacy/ (last updated
May 19, 2010) (depicting Facebook’s changing privacy default settings in
infographic).
85. Facebook, Inc., No. 0923184 (F.T.C. Nov. 29, 2011) (Complaint).
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with a consent settlement that binds Facebook to enhanced
86
scrutiny of privacy practices for twenty years.
It would be charitable for us to assume that Facebook’s
privacy lurch was spurred by dynamic pressures from competitors rather than as a cynical ploy to bait-and-switch new users.
But we should worry that it might instead be the latter and
thus represent an intentional, emerging new business strategy:
companies may use privacy lurches strategically to take advantage of the lock-in and even natural monopoly tendencies of
87
services like search engines and social networks. The strategy
works like this: create an online service with robust privacy
practices, which will help lure people in. Once these people
(now the service’s users) have invested their time, energy, and
social capital in the service and begin to feel the lock-in effects
of networks and familiarity, the service pivots, shifting toward
looser privacy policies that provide better profit-making opportunities. The users, with their privacy expectations dashed, will
have no way to leave.
C. THE PROBLEM WITH PRIVACY LURCHES
Most privacy experts weigh the impact of a privacy lurch
by assessing only the end result. In this way, they treat a lurch
no differently from the way they treat a brand new practice.
Thus, Facebook’s decision to expose more information about its
users to the general public should be assessed in precisely the
same way we would assess a brand new social networking service that had made the same privacy choices. But we miss
something important if we treat a privacy lurch as no more
than its end state.
Privacy lurches give rise to two distinct sets of privacy
harms, which I will call static and dynamic. The traditional approach to privacy analysis focuses solely on the static harms—
those that stem from a company’s new information handling
procedures. Consider the static harms resulting from two of the
scenarios presented above: when Google knocked down the
walls that had once separated databases, it created much more
86. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Facebook Settles FTC Charges
That It Deceived Consumers by Failing to Keep Privacy Promises (Nov. 29,
2011), http://ftc.gov/opa/2011/11/privacysettlement.shtm [hereinafter FTC
Press Release].
87. See Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L.
REV. 1149, 1182 (2008) (stating that users, especially those who use personalized search, can become locked in with a specific search provider).
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than a sum of the parts, revealing through the combination
sensitive new bits of information that its users had consciously
88
held back. When Facebook exposed once-private information
about its users to the general public and to Google’s indexing
spiders, it released embarrassing information (or worse) to
stalkers, harassers, ex-spouses, potential employers, and more.
For the past decade, information privacy theorists have
been developing taxonomies and theories to describe privacy
harms like these. None is as rich or complete as Daniel Solove’s
taxonomy, which breaks privacy harm into four categories—
information collection, processing, dissemination, and inva89
sions—further subdivided into sixteen subcategories. The
static harms that result from a privacy lurch are no different
than the harms that would have resulted had the company embraced the practices from the outset, which means that they
may fall within every part of Solove’s taxonomy. Google’s decision to break down the walls between databases risks raising
the harms of, at least, Solove’s subcategories of surveillance,
aggregation, identification, secondary use, exclusion, breach of
confidentiality, disclosure, increased accessibility, and distor90
tion. Facebook’s shift from private to public triggers the possibility of many of these same harms.
It is helpful to focus on the static harms resulting from a
lurch, because they can be compared to the industry status quo.
Facebook’s shift from private to public can and should be compared to the practices of other social networking sites, such as
Twitter, which has been public from birth.
But this Article sheds light on the special problems of dynamism and change, problems that reflect not only the new data handling policies governing data about users, but harms that
arise from the change itself. These are the harms felt by those
91
who have their expectations of privacy dashed. Sometimes,
88. See SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 1, at 1–10 (discussing
digital dossiers of data and the resulting privacy implications); Paul Ohm,
Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1746–48 (2010) [hereinafter Ohm,
Broken Promises] (describing how for privacy, aggregated data is often more
than the sum of its parts).
89. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 101–06 (2008)
[hereinafter SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY].
90. Id. at 104–05.
91. See generally HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE (2010) (describing breaches of
norms of information flow).

924

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:907

these people experience what might feel like new, independent
harms. More often, a privacy lurch accentuates or magnifies
the static harms they feel. These dynamic harms can be more
disruptive and harmful than the static harms alone.
Change can be deeply unsettling. Human beings prefer
predictability and stability, and abrupt change upsets those desires. Solove has noted these psychological effects, describing
how the “secondary use” of information “generates fear and uncertainty” and “creat[es] a sense of powerlessness and vulnera92
bility.” Helen Nissenbaum describes the “unpleasant jolt”
people experience when they are forced into a “clash of con93
texts.” We experience unexpected shifts as “nasty surprises of
94
discovery.”
Rapid change causes harm by disrupting settled expectations. This exacerbates the psychological impact, causing feel95
ings of “betrayal.” This betrayal may even extend beyond the
psychological and into an actual breach of contract if the
change calls into question the validity of a binding promise be96
tween the user and the service. When companies lurch, individual consumers can be made to feel as if they no longer have
97
what they initially bought. When instability becomes the
norm, people may lose trust in the companies selling services or
98
even entire industries. Some lurches cause information to flow
to friends or family in unintended ways, disrupting our most
99
important social connections.

92. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 89, at 132.
93. NISSENBAUM, supra note 91, at 225–26.
94. Id.
95. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 89, at 131.
96. See, e.g., Hartzog, supra note 10, at 1650–62.
97. See Grimmelmann, supra note 4, at 1169 (“If you—like most people—
formed your privacy expectations around the way the site originally worked,
they ceased being valid when the site changed.”).
98. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, COMMERCIAL DATA PRIVACY AND INNOVATION IN THE INTERNET ECONOMY: A DYNAMIC
POLICY FRAMEWORK 1 (2010), available at http://www.commerce.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/2010/december/iptf-privacy-green-paper.pdf (explaining that privacy “harms . . . undermine consumer trust in the Internet environment” which “may cause consumers to hesitate before adopting new services and impede innovative and productive uses of new technologies”).
99. Grimmelmann, supra note 4, at 1169 (describing controversy after
Friendster introduced the ability for users to see which other users had viewed
their profiles); McGeveran, supra note 15, at 1123–24 (recounting how some
users had surprise Christmas gifts ruined when Facebook ads revealed purchases to their recipients).
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Whether or not a privacy lurch constitutes contract breach,
it treats people unfairly, disrupting the goals of consumer pro100
tection. Privacy lurches can be unfair when they occur after a
user has been coaxed into volunteering personal information
101
based on promises of privacy that no longer apply. After a
lurch, a service is no longer the thing the consumer thought he
had agreed to buy; it is something much more harmful, possibly
not worth the positive things the user enjoys in return. A privacy lurch can also unfairly de-contextualize an individual, who
might have produced different or additional information had he
102
known the full extent to which his data was to be used.
Within a liberal theory frame, abrupt change can work
dignitary harms by “denying people control over the future use
of their data, which can be used in ways that have significant
103
effects on their lives.” Moreover, as privacy lurches proliferate, we might be left unwilling to trust the status quo, which
might lead us to self-censorship and disrupt our ability to de104
velop in ways we otherwise would.
Even in Julie Cohen’s post-modernist view of privacy, in
which change itself is not a bad thing, abrupt change is prob105
lematic.
“Vulnerability to environmental disruption” can
sometimes inspire people to develop the “play of everyday practice” that she identifies as the central goal of good information
106
policy. When ground rules change, people “are quick to ap100. I am using “unfair” here in the non-legal, colloquial way. Later, the
article will take up the more precise meaning in the FTC Act. See infra Part
III.C.3.
101. See SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 89, at 131 (“People
might not give out data if they know about a potential secondary use, such as
telemarketing, spam, or other forms of intrusive advertising.”).
102. ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA
BANKS, AND DOSSIERS 34 (1971) (“[A]n individual who is asked to provide a
simple item of information for what he believes to be a single purpose may
omit explanatory details that become crucial when his file is surveyed for unrelated purposes.”); SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 89, at 132
(“When data is removed from the original context in which it was collected, it
can more readily be misunderstood.”).
103. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 89, at 132; Cohen, supra note 13, at 1423–24.
104. See ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 23–51 (1967); Cohen,
supra note 13, at 1423–24. See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959) (discussing human behavior in social
interactions).
105. See JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW,
CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 56 (2012).
106. Id.

926

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:907

propriate unexpected juxtapositions of spaces and resources . . .
107
toward their own particular ends.” Privacy thus should be
about creating enough “breathing room” for people to engage in
108
“socially situated processes of boundary management.”
Still, Cohen is likely to criticize the kind of change described in this Article not because change itself is bad, but because the change operates only in one direction, toward in109
creasing surveillance and away from privacy.
She finds
privacy’s value in the way it creates fixed boundaries between
people and society to enable each individual to engage in “dynamic, emergent subjectivity from informational and spatial
110
constraint.” “[P]rivacy must balance a type of fixity against a
111
type of mobility . . . .”
Ultimately, exposing users to an ever-shifting landscape of
broken promises of privacy, in which every privacy policy is inconstant, whittles away expectations of privacy. I mean this in
both the everyday and the legalistic meaning of the phrase. Ex112
pectations of privacy set our shared norms. Constant privacy
lurches create a “widespread individual ignorance” about the
way information is used which in turn “hinders development
through the privacy marketplace of appropriate norms about
113
personal data use.” Scott McNealy’s quote that “You have zero privacy. Get over it,” becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy, as
users are conditioned to assume that privacy is trending to114
ward zero online. If we allow this kind of corporate-driven
norm redefinition to go unchecked, users-qua-citizens could become a governing majority. We cannot create a system in which
people live their lives without privacy and treat the everincreasing number of people whose lives are destroyed by pri115
vacy harms as the victims of forces outside their control.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 149.
109. See id. at 56; Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1682–83 (1999) (describing “one-sided bargains
that benefit data processors”).
110. COHEN, supra note 105, at 149.
111. Id.
112. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“Dramatic technological change may lead to periods in which popular
expectations are in flux and may ultimately produce significant changes in
popular attitudes.”).
113. Schwartz, supra note 109, at 1683.
114. A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461,
1462 (2000).
115. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[E]ven if the public
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More legalistically, diminishing expectations of privacy
might feed into constitutional law, because the Fourth
Amendment is tied to the so-called “reasonable expectations of
116
privacy” test. Prosecutors have cited the low-level of privacy
provided in online service privacy policies as a reason they can
117
order the release of copies of electronic mail or identify the
118
119
location of cell phones without probable cause or a warrant.
Arguments like these will strengthen and multiply over time,
as company practices push users to expect privacy in fewer sit120
uations.
D. IT WILL GET WORSE
By tracing the recent evolution of the market for online
services we can confidently predict that privacy lurches will
happen more frequently across more industries in larger steps.
Many companies are actively reshaping their business models
to try to profit from customer secrets, and by doing this, they
find themselves in a large, diverse market, squaring off against
competitors from what used to be non-competitive market seg121
ments. Thus, cable companies compete not only against their
historical competitors for broadband, the telephone companies,
but also against websites and search engines, credit card companies, retailers (web-based and brick-and-mortar), streaming
122
music websites, and e-book vendors. In a unified market for
consumer behavior, anybody who knows somebody else’s secrets becomes a competitor.
123
In earlier writing, I labeled this the “Google envy” effect.
Google created an astronomical amount of value for its employdoes not welcome the diminution of privacy that new technology entails, they
may eventually reconcile themselves to this development as inevitable.”).
116. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
117. See, e.g., Final Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 19, Warshak v.
United States, 490 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2007) (No. 06–4092) 2007 WL 2085416,
at *8, vacated on reh’g en banc, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008).
118. See, e.g., Brief for the United States at 20–21, In re Applications of the
United States of America for Historical Cell-Site Data, No. 11-20884 (5th Cir.
Feb. 15, 2012), available at http://epic.org/amicus/location/cell-phone
-tracking/USA-Opening-Brief.pdf.
119. Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81
MISS. L.J. 1309, 1349–51 (2012).
120. See id. at 1348.
121. See Ohm, Rise and Fall, supra note 6, at 1425.
122. Id. at 1425–26.
123. Id. at 1426.
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ees and shareholders by turning user searches into nickels,
124
through the magic of contextual advertising. Newly public
companies like Facebook, which feels new shareholder pressure
for profits, and broadband Internet providers are racing to do
125
similar things in order to generate similar returns, they hope.
These dynamic economic forces promise even more privacy
126
lurches to come and spell disaster for privacy. Facebook and
ISPs pour energy for innovation into thinking of ways to collect
and monetize more information without angering their custom127
ers or government regulators. Google feels the pressure of
competition nipping at its heels, and collects more information
128
just to stay ahead. Tens of thousands of other companies, including many companies that never before thought of themselves as involved in the sale or purchase of information, now
129
try to mimic the Google model. The evidence of all of this energy becomes manifest in the large, and slowly increasing, size
130
of databases collected by companies large and small. For the
end user, the consumer whose data has become the object for
trade in this market, the result is unsettling: a market in which
promises and expectations of privacy lurch like the unsteady
deck of a ship caught in turbulent waters.
II. DEALING WITH PRIVACY LURCHES
We should find ways to protect users from the harmful,
contract-breaching, dignity-impairing, psychologically jarring
instability that occurs during privacy lurches. From the broad
literature of information privacy scholarship that has emerged
during the past decade, I will focus primarily on solutions focused on requiring transparent notice coupled with meaningful
user choice. There are well-recognized problems with notice124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 1436–37.
127. See id.
128. Mat Honan, The Case Against Google, GIZMODO (Mar. 22, 2012, 12:19
PM), http://gizmodo.com/5895010/the-case-against-google (describing dynamic
economic forces pressuring Google to develop more privacy-invasive services).
129. See, e.g., Steve Hemsley, Data Collection Gets Innovative, MARKETING
WEEK (Oct. 11, 2012), www.marketingweek.co.uk/strategies-and-tactics/data
-collection-gets-innovative/4004088.article (describing a funeral home and an
ice cream company that collect user data).
130. See Taylor Hatmaker, 5 Ways ‘Big Data’ Is Changing the World, ENTREPRENEUR (Oct. 7, 2012), www.entrepreneur.com/article/224582 (discussing
the “huge stores of data” collected by companies, governments, and organizations).
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and-choice solutions, described below. But by narrowing our focus to the special features that distinguish a privacy lurch from
other privacy problems, we can overcome many of the shortcomings of past proposals.
A. NOTICE-AND-CHOICE AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS
1. General Principles
The most common regulatory response to a privacy problem, especially in the United States, is reliance on notice-and131
choice. Notice-and-choice solutions depend on market forces
to provide consumers with the amount of privacy that their
preferences—revealed and express—suggest they truly desire,
132
even when they claim to want more. The bedrock of these solutions is the requirement that every consumer must be shown
a detailed description of how information about him or her is
133
collected, used, and shared. If this requirement is met, then
any suggestion that we do more to protect privacy will be characterized by the proponents of notice-and-choice as paternalistic, disrespectful of the free market, or catering to users who
134
want to have their cake and eat it too.
When regulators embrace notice-and-choice, they tend to
relegate their responsibilities to monitoring the data-handling
promises being made by companies, ensuring that users are being presented detailed descriptions of those promises, usually
in the form of a detailed privacy policy, and trying to detect circumstances in which promises are broken for further investiga135
tion or action. For most of the past decade, this describes the
form of regulation that has been embraced by the FTC, which
136
has identified notice as “[t]he most fundamental principle.”
Even outside the United States, notice-and-choice play a
disproportionately important regulatory role, although it is of-

131. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 7–9
(June 1998), available at www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23a.pdf.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See Calo, supra note 14, at 1049 (“Notice purports to respect the basic
autonomy of the consumer or citizen by arming her with information and placing the ultimate decision in her hands.”).
135. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 131, at 40–41 (discussing the
government’s “limited authority over the collection and dissemination of personal data collected online”).
136. See id. at 7.
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ten supported by other substantive protections. In the European Union data protection directive, for example, two paramount Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) are “Purpose Specification” and “Use Limitation,” which operate not
138
unlike the way the FTC implements notice-and-choice.
Ryan Calo explains why notice-and-choice-based privacy
139
regulations are popular with many parties. Regulators view
140
them as “cheap to implement and easy to enforce.” They see
141
them as unlikely to significantly impair innovation. Company
representatives see notice-and-choice mandates as far less ob142
jectionable than the alternatives.
2. Information-Quality Problems
Despite the popularity and widespread adoption of noticeand-choice rules for privacy, critics attack them unsparingly.
Most of these critics focus on a broad list of information quality
143
problems. Nobody reads privacy policies, and even if people
did, they would not be likely to understand them, because they
144
are often very long and full of legalese. There are also too
many privacy policies, especially as so much economic and so145
cial activity moves to the web.
Researchers at Carnegie
Mellon estimated that it would cost the American economy
hundreds of billions of dollars in lost worker productivity if eve146
ry worker decided to skim every privacy policy encountered.
137. See, e.g., Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995
O.J. (L 281) 31, 34 [hereinafter Directive 95/46/EC] (discussing the requirement of an “explicit and legitimate” purpose for personal data processing).
138. Id.
139. Calo, supra note 14, at 1047–50.
140. Id. at 1048.
141. Id. at 1048–49.
142. See id. at 1050 (“Mandated notice can and does face opposition, but
opposition tends to be less fierce than to top-down dictates regarding what a
company can and cannot do.”).
143. See supra notes 13–14.
144. See Bianca Bosker, Facebook Privacy Policy Explained: It’s Longer
than the Constitution, HUFFINGTON POST (May 13, 2010, 12:24 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/12/facebook-privacy-policys_n_574389
.html.
145. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated
Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 687–89 (2011) (describing the “overload effect” in many contexts including online disclosure).
146. Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543, 544, 564 (2008).

2013]

BRANDING PRIVACY

931

Even worse, humans suffer from bounded rationality and
cognitive biases that conspire to make us likely to misunder147
stand privacy policies. Several surveys have found that many
survey respondents believed that by publishing a document
called a “privacy policy,” a company promised to protect priva148
cy, regardless of the content of the policy. Others have suggested in studies that the ways companies frame privacy risks
have a significant effect on acceptance, with the best strategy
(from the point of view of the company) to state things in vague
149
or uncertain ways. Consumers tend to trust the privacy practices of websites with a neat appearance and design, an exam150
ple of the representativeness heuristic. Other examples include the ways in which prospect theory, the endowment effect,
and hyperbolic discounting can explain, in part, how people in151
correctly assess privacy risk.
3. Traditional Notice-and-Choice During a Lurch
It is critical to note how the problems with notice-andchoice seem greatly exacerbated during a privacy lurch. When a
user signs onto a new service for the first time, she at least receives cues from the unfamiliarity of the service that trigger a
heightened attention to promises being made about information
152
handling, if just a little. But after a user has settled into a
service, she has little reason to continue to read changes to pri153
vacy policies.
Consider the mechanics of notice-and-choice both during
the initial launch of a company and after a privacy lurch. At
the launch of a new service, several contextual clues mitigate
some of the information-quality problems, yet these clues are
absent during a lurch. For example, notice-and-choice during
initial launch tends to follow a nearly invariant pattern: user
147. Calo, supra note 14, at 1052–55.
148. Joseph Turow et al., The Federal Trade Commission and Consumer
Privacy in the Coming Decade, 3 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 723, 730–32
(2007–08).
149. See Acquisti, supra note 14, § 18.3.2, at 370.
150. Id. § 18.3.2, at 371.
151. Id. §§ 18.3.2, 18.3.3, at 371–72.
152. See McDonald & Cranor, supra note 146, at 559 (discussing that if users are going to read a privacy policy, they will do it on their first visit).
153. There are also problems with choice, separate from the notice problems discussed in the text. Many online services are offered without any significant competition, meaning users are forced into take-it-or-leave-it situations. See Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 87, at 1180–82.
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presses the “sign up” button; user provides some basic registration information; user is presented with the terms of service
154
and privacy policy; user must click “I Agree” to continue.
155
Even though most users do not read the terms of service, and
156
even though we should not want most users to do so, the
highly evolved ceremony of notice-and-choice during initial
launch gives users and their advocates a chance to notice the
new service.
In contrast to this pervasive similarity, every lurch is different. Without the ceremony of the initial login, each company
approaches notice-and-choice about change in different ways,
and many companies treat their own different changes at different times in different ways. Some companies—probably the
minority—prevent users from engaging with the service until
157
they see the terms of service and click “I agree” once again.
Most companies allow the user to engage the service without
interruption, but send notices and alerts about the change.
Google, for example, pervaded its pages with small, highlighted
notices throughout February 2012, all of which included the
158
pithy catchphrase “This Stuff Matters.” Some companies send
159
out-of-band notices on blogs or anachronistically on paper let160
ters sent via snail mail.

154. See, e.g., Turow et al., supra note 148, at 738 (discussing click-through
privacy notices).
155. See id. at 740 (reporting the results of a survey finding that “only 1.4%
reported reading EULAs [End User License Agreements] often and thoroughly, 66.2% admit to rarely reading or browsing the contents of EULAs, and
7.7% indicated that they have not noticed these agreements in the past or
have never read them”); Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R.
Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Testing a Law and Economics Approach to Standard Form Contracts 1 (N.Y. Univ. Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Org.
Research, Working Paper No. 09-40, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1443256 (reporting that “only one or two out of
every thousand retail software shoppers chooses to access the license agreement”).
156. See McDonald & Cranor, supra note 146, at 565 (calculating the cost
of actually reading privacy policies as over 200 hours and $3500 per American
Internet user).
157. See, e.g., Susan E. Gindin, Nobody Reads Your Privacy Policy or
Online Contract? Lessons Learned and Questions Raised by the FTC’s Action
Against Sears, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 1–2 (2009) (discussing
Sears’s acceptance requirement before consumers could install a tracking application).
158. See Whitten, supra note 5.
159. See, e.g., id.; Mark Zuckerberg, An Open Letter from Facebook Founder
Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK BLOG (Dec. 1, 2009, 8:23 PM), http://blog

2013]

BRANDING PRIVACY

933

Distressingly, companies often try to game information
conditions during a lurch, to try to hide their true designs.
Even when companies change practices in a way that significantly reduces user privacy, they will often try to downplay the
risk to privacy sometimes making specious claims about the
161
benefits to the users of the change. And the vehicles used to
provide notice-and-choice—privacy policies, press releases, blog
posts, and snail mail letters—give companies the textual richness they need to engage in these misleading propaganda campaigns. This has given rise to a new form of corporate writing
that one might almost appreciate for its craftiness and subtlety,
if the results were not deception and particular harm: privacy
162
lurch doublespeak.
For example, Google touted the benefits of its decision to
tear down the walls between its databases as part of “efforts to
integrate our different products more closely so that we can
create a beautifully simple, intuitive user experience across
163
Google.”
When Charter Communications decided to begin
monitoring its users in partnership with NebuAd, its letter to
consumers touted the improved ads each customer would soon
see: “[T]he advertising you typically see online will better reflect the interests you express through your web-surfing activity. You will not see more ads - just ads that are more relevant
164
to you.” And Mark Zuckerberg’s December 2009 blog post
highlighted some privacy-friendly changes the company had
made without hinting at the very anti-privacy changes made
165
simultaneously.
.facebook.com/blog.php?post=190423927130 (describing changes made to privacy policies).
160. See, e.g., Letter from Joe Stackhouse, Senior Vice President, Customer
Operations, Charter Commc’ns, to Charter Customers (Apr. 29, 2008) [hereinafter Charter Letter], available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/
pdf/technology/20080514_charter_letter.pdf .
161. See, e.g., Kevin Bankston, Facebook’s New Privacy Changes: The Good,
the Bad, and the Ugly, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. DEEPLINKS BLOG (Dec.
9, 2009), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/12/facebooks-new-privacy-changes
-good-bad-and-ugly.
162. See generally GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949) (describing a fictional totalitarian society controlled in part by government propaganda).
163. Whitten, supra note 5.
164. Charter Letter, supra note 160; see Saul Hansell, Charter Will Monitor Customers’ Web Surfing to Target Ads, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (May 14,
2008, 8:40 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/05/14/charter-will-monitor
-customers-web-surfing-to-target-ads/.
165. See Bankston, supra note 161; Zuckerberg, supra note 159.
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B. IMPROVING NOTICE-AND-CHOICE DURING A LURCH
Traditional notice-and-choice approaches are not nearly
enough to address the special problem of a privacy lurch. The
FTC has acknowledged this, calling for special rules during
166
times of “material” privacy change. Others have seized on
this problem, albeit not in the context of lurches alone, and
have proposed better forms of notice-and-choice. None of these
proposals, however, does enough to take on the significant information-quality problems during a privacy lurch.
Many researchers have proposed ways to improve on textheavy privacy policies. Most of these proposals have turned to
tables and symbols to try distill dozens of choices into more user-friendly formats. Researchers have long talked about finding
167
a “nutrition label” equivalent for privacy policies.
Lorrie
Cranor’s research group at Carnegie Mellon is a leader in this
field, and has proposed several alternatives, heavy with sym168
bols and grids. FTC consultants have proposed standardized
169
privacy notices for the financial industry. Many others have
170
proposed different alternatives.
But although each of these alternative designs is an improvement on text-based privacy policies, none seems to do a
166. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF
RAPID CHANGE 57–58 (2012) [hereinafter FTC FINAL REPORT], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf.
167. See, e.g., Corey A. Ciocchetti, The Future of Privacy Policies: A Privacy
Nutrition Label Filled with Fair Information Practices, 26 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1, 4 (2009); Patrick Gage Kelley et al., A “Nutrition Label” for Privacy, SYMP. ON USABLE PRIVACY & SECURITY (2009), available at
http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/soups/2009/proceedings/a4-kelley.pdf.
168. Robert W. Reeder et al., A User Study of the Expandable Grid Applied
to P3P Privacy Policy Visualization, WORKSHOP ON PRIVACY IN THE ELECTRONIC
SOC’Y (2008), available at http://www.lorrie.cranor.org/pubs/
wpes24reeder.pdf.
169. See generally KLEIMANN COMMC’N GRP., INC., EVOLUTION OF A PROTOTYPE FINANCIAL PRIVACY NOTICE (2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
privacy/privacyinitiatives/ftcfinalreport060228.pdf.
170. See ALAN LEVY & MANOJ HASTAK, CONSUMER COMPREHENSION OF
FINANCIAL PRIVACY NOTICES passim (2008), available at http://www
.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/Levy-Hastak-Report.pdf (suggesting, in report prepared for seven federal agencies, the use of tables in financial privacy
disclosure); CTR. FOR INFO. POLICY LEADERSHIP, HUNTON & WILLIAMS, MULTILAYERED NOTICES EXPLAINED passim (2005), available at http://aimp
.apec.org/Documents/2005/ECSG/DPM1/05_ecsg_dpm1_003.pdf
(discussing
various forms of privacy notices and suggesting a layered notice package approach); Janice Y. Tsai et al., The Effect of Online Privacy Information on Purchasing Behavior: An Experimental Study, 22 INFO. SYS. RES. 254, 258–66
(2010) (testing efficacy of privacy icons).
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much better job than a privacy policy of being noticed and un171
derstood. None of the simplified labels seems simple enough.
Studies have shown that many of them continue to confuse
172
people.
None has been widely embraced, despite endorse173
ments from important regulators. The authors of the new designs themselves acknowledge continuing shortcomings and
174
continue to search for something better.
What has sunk every one of these efforts is the inherent
complexity of the problem. These researchers have all started
from the proposition that companies should be able to use information in any way they see fit, and accordingly, they have
concluded that privacy notices must be plastic enough to accurately represent every possible permutation of information175
handling practices.
The pressure toward complexity comes not only from a desire to give companies the freedom to use information in every
possible permutation; it comes from the other direction as well,
from privacy watchdogs searching for tools that will lead to
consumers making informed choices. Given the highly contex176
tual nature of privacy preferences, the more details we can
provide consumers, the better informed they will be.
These pressures that drive toward complexity seem always
to outweigh countervailing desires for simple and easy-to-digest
designs. Every one of the new designs summarized above con177
tains dozens of words and a blur of icons, colors, and grids.
Privacy, in other words, is not nutrition, according to the
top minds who have considered the disclosure problem. With a
nutrition label, people are interested most in calories, which is
171. See Calo, supra note 14, at 1033 (“Studies show only marginal improvement in consumer understanding where privacy policies get expressed as
tables, icons, or labels, assuming the consumer even reads them.”).
172. LEVY & HASTAK, supra note 170, at 2; Patrick Gage Kelley et al.,
Standardizing Privacy Notices: An Online Study of the Nutrition Label Approach, CMU-CYLAB-90-014 (2010), available at http://www.cylab.cmu.edu/
files/pdfs/tech_reports/CMUCyLab09014.pdf.
173. FTC FINAL REPORT, supra note 166, at 62.
174. See generally Aleecia M. McDonald et al., A Comparative Study of
Online Privacy Policies and Formats, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 9TH INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES 37, 37–55 (Ian
Goldberg & Mikhail J. Atallah eds., 2009) (finding that natural-language privacy policies are no more effective than their “jargon-laden” counterparts and
offering observations for creating better privacy policy language).
175. See supra notes 167–71.
176. See NISSENBAUM, supra note 91, at 109.
177. See supra notes 168–70 and accompanying text.
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thus given a place of prominence on the top line. Those with
more individualized needs—for example, those seeking a particular vitamin or mineral or engaged in a low-carbohydrate diet—will find some of the information they want further down
the label. But despite catering to many needs, a nutrition label
contains a mere fraction of the amount of information contained in any of the “simplified” privacy labels presented
178
above.
Focusing on the privacy lurch offers a way out of the complexity quagmire. In order to assess a lurch, we do not need to
consider the entire infinitely rich set of ways companies can collect, use, and share information. Instead, we can ask a simpler,
more isolated question: how much has this company departed
from its original privacy commitments? In some cases, the answer to this question will be gloriously reducible to a single
quantity: this company has doubled the number of people who
can touch the information, or it has tripled the amount of time
it retains the data. There of course will continue to be significant variability in the way we measure and talk about privacy
change, but the problem seems fundamentally simpler than the
“anything and everything” problem tackled by the researchers
described above.
And the simplicity of describing the impact of a privacy
lurch leads directly to new, better forms of notice that are much
more compact and much easier to understand. One might imagine a “green/yellow/red” light system summarizing how much a
179
company has shifted away from its key privacy commitments.
Prior attempts to protect privacy during a lurch run headlong into two significant problems: instability and information
180
quality. The expectation-defying instability of a lurch gives
rise to the harms discussed in Part I. The information-quality
difficulties of the online environment explain why traditional
notice-and-choice approaches do not do enough to protect privacy. Luckily, there is an entire area of information-policy doctrine and theory—the study of trademarks and brands—that
provides tools for both protecting consumer expectations from
charges of instability and for improving information quality.

178. See supra notes 168–70.
179. Much will turn, of course, on how we identify the “key” commitments,
a question taken up in Part III.B.1.
180. See supra Part I.C.
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C. LEVERAGING TRADEMARKS
Critics of notice-and-choice decry the fundamental information-quality problems associated with online privacy poli181
cies. Given the persistent frequency of these complaints, it is
surprising that nobody has previously turned to trademark
law, an area of law whose central focus has been the information power of particular symbols in the consumer market182
place, for novel solutions. Trademarks can provide precisely
what is needed to remedy the instability and informationquality problems at the heart of the problems with privacy
lurches.
1. Trademarks,

183

Brands, and the Law

The law has recognized the commercial importance of
marking goods and services since antiquity. From the first time
a potter placed his distinctive mark on his wares, merchants
have used words and symbols as information devices, efficient
means to communicate to potential customers that the product
or service has been backed by a known source who guarantees
184
a specific level of quality and accountability. Today, governments provide legal support to bolster and protect the information function of these words and symbols, through trade185
mark and other unfair competition laws.
Trademark law extends protection to the first user of a dis186
tinctive mark in commerce. For marks that are words (as opposed to symbols such as logos) distinctiveness is measured
along a scale from generic to descriptive to “inherently distinctive,” a category further subdivided into suggestive, arbitrary,
187
and fanciful. Inherently distinctive marks are protected upon
181. See supra Part II.A.1.
182. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
183. For most of the online services discussed in this Article, the relevant
marks are service marks, not trademarks. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (defining “trademark” and “service mark”). But to simplify the discussion, this Article will use the word “trademark” throughout.
184. See generally FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
THE LAW RELATING TO TRADE-MARKS (1925) (discussing the development of
the law of trademarks).
185. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark
Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1987) (discussing the
economics of trademarks and intellectual property law).
186. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006).
187. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir.
1976).
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188

first use, but descriptive marks cannot be protected until the
consuming public associates “secondary meaning” with them,
189
which is often demonstrated through the use of surveys. The
Lanham Act, the federal trademark law, implements a national
registration system, through which trademark owners can register marks giving them a range of procedural advantages at
trial and putting competitors on constructive nationwide no190
tice. A civil complaint for trademark infringement is an allegation by a user of a mark that another is using a mark in a
191
confusingly similar way. Prevailing parties are entitled to
damages, fees, injunctions, and the destruction of infringing ar192
ticles.
Trademarks implicate laws beyond trademark law when
they are treated as communications from producers to consum193
ers.
By using a particular trademark, a producer makes
claims about the qualities of his good or service. If these claims
turn out to be false, laws that prohibit commercial deception—
194
most importantly false advertising law—might be triggered.
2. The Information-Quality Power of a Name
This Article does not argue that traditional trademark law
and theory says much about the problem of the privacy lurch.
In fact, traditional theory treats trademarks as nothing more
195
than symbols of source alone. During a privacy lurch, con188. But see 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2006) (permitting registration of a trademark before use if registrant has bona fide intent to use).
189. Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 195 (1985).
190. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1072 (2006).
191. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (2006); Boston Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck
Tours, LLC, 531 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2008).
192. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116–1118 (2006).
193. See J. Shahar Dillbary, Getting the Word Out: The Informational
Function of Trademarks, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 991, 1023–24 (2009) (explaining
that trademarks serve to convey not only the source of sale or manufacture,
but also information about the product itself).
194. E.g., Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 14 (7th Cir.
1992) (finding the use of mark “Ricelyte” to be false advertising under Lanham
Act § 43(a)(2) because the product contained no rice ingredients).
195. Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1968) (“[T]he only
legally relevant function of a trademark is to impart information as to the
source or sponsorship of the product.”); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley,
Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV.
777, 788–89 (2003) (“Trademark law thus historically limited itself to preventing uses of marks that ‘defrauded the public’ by confusing people into believing
that an infringer’s goods were produced or sponsored by the trademark holder.”).
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sumers are often misled about the nature and quality of the
service they are using, but they are rarely confused about the
196
identity of the company providing the service.
We will return to trademark theory in Part III, but for
now, I am making a descriptive claim about the words and
symbols we call trademarks themselves rather than a broader
claim about the theory of trademark law. Trademarks are considered worthy of legal protection because consumers tend to
associate them with meaning, and this happens because
trademarks are designed to be efficient delivery mechanisms
197
for meaning. To put it another way, trademarks are wellengineered meaning machines. We can take advantage of this
fact to use trademarks to impart notice during a privacy lurch.
But although scholars and courts have often noted the way
trademarks take on meaning, they rarely explain why these
particular words and symbols, and not others, serve this func198
tion so well. To support the claim that a trademark can do a
better job communicating with consumers during a privacy
lurch than traditional forms of notice-and-choice, we need to lift
the hood on the meaning machine. Trademarks impart meaning for reasons that can be divided into three categories: the
inherent qualities of trademarks, the engineered attributes of
trademarks, and the way trademarks tend to be used.
First, trademarks act like meaning machines because of
their inherent qualities, which in turn flow from the way the
law defines a protectable trademark. Trademarks in any
199
form—text, logos, slogans —tend to be simple and short. Most
textual trademarks range from single words to short slogans;
indeed, “the longer the slogan, the less probability that it func200
tions as a trademark.” Designs and symbols can also serve as
201
trademarks, but again, most trademarks tend to be simple,
not ornate.
Because trademarks convey meaning in an efficient and
compact form, they are much easier for a consumer to understand than a typical privacy policy: dozens of pages, full of
196. See infra Part III.A.2.
197. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 195, at 778.
198. See Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1688 (1999) (“Trademarks are a compact and
efficient means of communicating information to consumers.”).
199. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
200. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 7:20 (4th ed. 2012).
201. Id. § 7:24.
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dense, incomprehensible legalese. Consumers can easily allocate the time and attention to “read” a trademark, and almost
no consumer will fail to notice when a trademark changes.
The brevity of a trademark can counter the doublespeak
202
problem too often encountered during a privacy lurch. By letting companies announce privacy promises using screens full of
text alone, we invite evasion and confusion. If instead we could
use the trademark as the principal channel for communicating
important privacy changes to the consumer, we could constrain
the harmful creativity of privacy counsel.
The other inherent reason trademarks impart meaning is
perhaps the most elemental: a trademark is a name. Trademarks are intertwined in complicated ways with a company’s
203
identity. Consumers collect impressions about their interactions with a company over time, and they build those impres204
sions into a mental model linked directly to the name. The
name itself creates a mental placeholder for those impressions.
Second, trademarks are meaning machines because they
are engineered to be so. Companies do not select trademarks on
a whim; instead, they employ experts in marketing and advertising to engineer marks that exploit human psyche and cogni205
tion, burning particular meanings into memory. For decades,
researchers have explored the cognitive and psychological
mechanisms that give trademarks their power to conjure posi206
tive brand associations. Marketing experts have developed
strategies for building better, more memorable and meaningful
207
trademarks: manipulating word structure, component mean208
209
210
211
212
ing, sound, color, typeface, and imagery.
202. See supra notes 162–65 and accompanying text.
203. See Laura Heymann, Naming, Identity, and Trademark Law, 86 IND.
L.J. 381 (2011) (explaining that a trademark has denotative, connotative, and
associative functions as it relates to the company it stands for).
204. See generally Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507 (2008) (discussing consumer impressions and cognitive bias).
205. See Jacob Jacoby, The Psychological Foundations of Trademark Law:
Secondary Meaning, Genericism, Fame, Confusion and Dilution, 91 TRADEMARK REP. 1013, 1023–24 (2001).
206. See id.
207. See Ira Schloss, Chickens and Pickles, Choosing a Brand Name, J.
ADVERTISING RES., Dec. 1981, at 47.
208. See generally Kevin Lane Keller et al., The Effects of Brand Name
Suggestiveness on Advertising Recall, 62 J. MARKETING 48 (1998) (examining
the effects of brand name meaningfulness).
209. See generally Richard R. Klink, Creating Brand Names with Meaning:
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Marketing professionals use these tactics and others to
213
create brand symbols that are deeply imbued with meaning.
The law does not grant trademark rights to arbitrary symbols.
It is only when symbols are associated in the mind of the consumer with particular meaning that the law applies.
The third set of reasons that trademarks act as meaning
machines stems from the way trademarks are used by producers. Producers almost always display trademarks prominently.
In fact, a buried symbol will probably not even earn protec214
tion. Often, a product’s trademark will be the largest element
215
on its label. On the web, the principal service mark is almost
always posted directly at the top of the page, well above the vir216
tual “fold” demarcated by the bottom of the browser screen.
Almost always, the logo or name is placed in the upper-left or
middle-left of the web page, areas research indicates are the
217
first a consumer views.
Not only do producers display trademarks prominently, but
also they use them consistently. At least with established
brands, producers often change a name or logo only after great
deliberation and study. In fact, the launch of a redesigned logo
The Use of Sound Symbolism, 11 MARKETING LETTERS 5 (2000) (discussing the
use of sound symbolism to create brand names).
210. See generally Channa Leichtling, How Color Affects Marketing, TUORO
C. ACCT. & BUS. SOC’Y J., Spring 2002, at 22, available at http://www.touro
.edu/tabs/journal02/tabsallc.pdf#page=22 (discussing the use of color in marketing).
211. See generally Terry L. Childers & Jeffrey Jass, All Dressed up with
Something to Say: Effects of Typeface Semantic Associations on Brand Perceptions and Consumer Memory, 12 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 93 (2002) (examining
the effects of typeface on consumers).
212. See generally Tushnet, supra note 204 (discussing consumers’ mental
image of marks).
213. See Beebe, supra note 16, at 656–57.
214. Ex parte Procter & Gamble Co., 96 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 272, 272 (Chief
Examiner 1953) (noting that trademark law “clearly does not contemplate that
the public will be required or expected to browse through a group of words or
scan an entire page to decide that a particular word or words are intended to
identify the product of applicant”).
215. See MCCARTHY, supra note 200, § 7:3 (“[T]he prominence of a word or
symbol is certainly an important element in determining whether it creates a
separate commercial impression on the average buyer.”).
216. See Shaun Cronin, Designing for the New Fold: Web Design Post
Monitorism, WEBDESIGN TUTS+ (Jan. 25, 2011), http://webdesign.tutsplus
.com/articles/design-theory/designing-for-the-new-fold-web-design-post
-monitorism/.
217. Jakob Nielsen, F-Shaped Pattern for Reading Web Content, USEIT
(Apr. 17, 2006), http://www.useit.com/alertbox/reading_pattern.html.

942

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:907

is often a time of internal anxiety and external attention, as
companies build marketing campaigns to tout new logos and
the way they reflect their corporate values and qualities, while
218
the web’s chattering classes debate each redesign.
3. Trademarks as Symbols of Privacy Practices
Orthodox trademark law tends to focus on only one particular type of meaning, the identity of the source of the product
219
or service. But because trademarks are meaning machines,
consumers tend to associate them with many other meanings in
addition to source. These additional meanings can include attitudes about a company’s approach to privacy. Before turning,
in the next Part, from the descriptive to the prescriptive, consider one way privacy and branding tend already to be intertwined.
Companies understand how naming can increase the visibility of a privacy lurch. In 2010, Google launched Google Buzz,
220
a platform for social networking layered atop Gmail, but the
company ill-advisedly decided to automatically enroll all Gmail
users, and even revealed publicly each user’s most frequent
221
Gmail correspondents. In 2007, Facebook launched Facebook
Ads and Facebook Beacon, together a “social marketing” advertising platform that caused users to become the unwitting so222
cial spokespeople for companies whose products they bought.
Both launches ended disastrously, as consumers first and then
regulators next became concerned about the implications for
223
privacy. In both cases, the FTC initiated actions against the
224
companies, which resulted in sweeping consent agreements.
218. One blog describes its mission this way: “[Our] sole purpose is to
chronicle and provide opinions on corporate and brand identity work, focusing
mostly on identity design and a modest amount of packaging. We cover redesigns and new designs. Nothing more, nothing less, what you see is what you
get.” Under Consideration, LLC, About Brand New, BRAND NEW, http://www
.underconsideration.com/brandnew/about-brand-new.php (last visited Nov. 28,
2012).
219. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
220. Edward Ho, Google Buzz in Gmail, OFFICIAL GMAIL BLOG (Feb. 9,
2010), http://www.gmail.blogspot.com/2010/02/google-buzz-in-gmail.html.
221. Molly Wood, Google Buzz: Privacy Nightmare, CNET (Feb. 10, 2010),
http://news.cnet.com/8301-31322_3-10451428-256.html.
222. See Louise Story, Facebook Is Marketing Your Brand Preferences (With
Your Permission), N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2007, at C5.
223. See Nicholas Carlson, WARNING: Google Buzz Has a Huge Privacy
Flaw, BUS. INSIDER: SILICON ALLEY INSIDER (Feb. 10, 2010), http://www
.businessinsider.com/warning-google-buzz-has-a-huge-privacy-flaw-2010-2; see
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Contrast Facebook Beacon with Facebook’s slow migration
from private to public, and Google Buzz with Google’s decision
to tear down the walls between its databases. In privacy circles,
Buzz and Beacon are widely seen as disasters, deplorable decisions that justifiably attracted regulatory scrutiny and ultimately were driven out of existence. The other two decisions,
while criticized, have not yet drawn the same kind of intense
criticism, although it is still a bit too early to tell in the case of
Google’s database decision.
These side-by-side comparisons demonstrate the power of a
name. We should not be surprised that branded shifts have
generated more negative meaning in the minds of consumers
than unbranded shifts made by the very same companies. A
name casts a spotlight on an event in ways that focus the mind.
Giving the service a name gives critics power over the thing
named and the salience needed to support a messaging cam225
paign. It is much more difficult to launch a campaign against
a privacy lurch with no name.
III. BRANDING PRIVACY
If we are worried about the disruptive and potentially
harmful force of dramatic, expectation-defying privacy lurches,
we should consider using the law to tie privacy promises to
trademarks and brands, an approach I am calling “branded
privacy.” Privacy law’s principal difficulty is with endemic information-quality problems surrounding meaningful notice
online. Trademarks are designed precisely to focus consumer
attention on a particular set of important meanings.
The devil will be in the details, so this Part considers the
details closely. Subpart A, after first presenting the proposal,
connects theories of privacy and trademark and demonstrates
how branded privacy can be well-supported by both. Next, subalso Steven Levy, Do Real Friends Share Ads?, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 10, 2007, at
30 (noting that more than 30,000 Facebook users joined the Facebook group
“Facebook: Stop Invading my Privacy” in the first week).
224. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Facebook Settles Charges
That It Deceived Consumers by Failing to Keep Privacy Promises (Nov. 29,
2011), http://ftc.gov/opa/2011/11/privacysettlement.shtm; Press Release, Fed.
Trade Comm’n, FTC Gives Final Approval to Settlement with Google Over
Buzz Rollout, (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/10/buzz.shtm.
225. Compare the debate over the Carnivore FBI wiretapping technology:
the technology still exists today, but now bears the much less menacing name
DCS-1000, and it rarely gets mentioned in debates anymore. Orin Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother That Isn’t, 97
NW. U. L. REV. 607, 653–54 (2003).
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parts B and C discuss the various shapes the proposal might
take and how it might be implemented through common-law
suits, the work of regulatory agencies, or new legislation. After
presenting, in subpart D, examples of how branded privacy
might work in action, the discussion concludes in subpart E,
weighing the costs and benefits of the approach.
A. TYING BRANDS TO PRIVACY PROMISES
I call the proposal “branded privacy.” Policy makers should
treat some of the data-handling decisions of almost every company as an immutable set of choices connected to the trade226
mark the company has chosen for its product or service. This
connection should be set at the birth of the mark, and a company that later decides to abandon a promise of privacy it has
made to it is customers should be forced to choose a new mark.
The underlying logic of the proposal is that by shifting away
from a central privacy promise, the company essentially creates, from the vantage point of consumer privacy, an entirely
new service, one that cannot justifiably be associated with the
227
goodwill attached to the older mark. Google’s consolidated
user database, Facebook’s default “visible to the Internet” setting, and Charter Communication’s foray into behavioral advertising all represent business strategies that are different in
kind—not simply in degree—from the business models they replaced. Users are entitled to be given clear, unambiguous notice
of changes to privacy like these, but given the endemic information-quality problems online, the only effective way to deliver this is by leveraging the unique power of a trademark.
Although this prescription is novel—my research turned
up no other proposal remotely similar to this one—it is not radical. It is well-supported by many theories that have been advanced by scholars of both information privacy and trademark
law. Consider the teachings of each field in turn.

226. Once again, I am using the term “trademark” to refer to trademarks,
service marks, and in some cases even to the more general term, “brand.” See
supra note 183.
227. See Grimmelmann, supra note 4, at 1201 (“[T]he initial design of the
system is a representation to users that information they supply will be used
in certain ways; by changing the service in a fundamental, privacy-breaching
way, the site also breaches that implicit representation.”).
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1. Branded Privacy and Privacy Law Theory
Branded privacy sits comfortably within theories of information privacy law in at least four ways. First, it pushes companies to think deeply and consciously about their commitments to information privacy in the early stages of their
lifecycles. Second, this rationale echoes motivations for “Priva228
cy by Design,” an influential new approach to privacy, but
improves upon some of its shortcomings. Third, it continues the
work of scholars trying to tie online privacy to consumer protection law by finding a way to create effective warning labels for
the Internet. Fourth, it might nudge companies finally to compete on privacy, a market whose absence many privacy scholars
have long lamented.
a. Forcing Companies to Make Privacy Commitments
Branded privacy responds to the possibility that companies
may embrace privacy lurches as intentional strategies by coaxing companies to commit themselves to fully specified and publicly revealed promises about the way they handle information
229
at the time they launch their services to the public. And once
they make these commitments, they should feel strong regulatory pressure to stick with them.
Branded privacy thus recognizes that it is difficult for a
company to “bolt on” privacy after the fact. We should encourage laws, regulations, and enforcement practices that nudge
companies to think about privacy at birth, by weighing the pros
(innovative new features) against the cons (threats of privacy
harm to users) of any design decision. Branded privacy will not
dictate whether a company should choose the privacyenhancing or privacy-diminishing path, but it will bind them to
their initial choices.
And after these choices are made, and companies announce
them publicly—memorializing them, for example, in privacy
policies—they will be treated like constitutional decisions, and
they will stick. From that point forward, companies will be allowed to make small tweaks to minor information-handling policies. But plaintiffs and regulators will be able to treat any
228. See generally PRIVACY BY DESIGN, http://privacybydesign.ca/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2012).
229. I take for inspiration Tim Wu’s recent proposal for a “constitutional
approach to the information economy.” TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH 304
(2010). Although the labels are similar, the concepts described are quite distinct.
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choice to change a core privacy commitment as an act of reconstitution, which would require more in the way of public notice
and government compliance.
In order for branded privacy to work, companies must
somehow be incentivized both to make concrete privacy commitments and to give the public notice of those commitments.
Otherwise, branded privacy might be gamed by companies that
provide only muddled or vague promises of privacy, and likewise it will be defeated if companies delay making decisions
about privacy issues.
It may be that if some regulatory body publicly embraces
branded privacy—for example, if the FTC announces it will
230
seek to enforce branded privacy —this alone will serve an important new notice-forcing function. Given the severity of the
rebranding remedy, companies might feel added pressure to declare their privacy commitments unambiguously and clearly at
launch. Company executives will likely be terrified by the prospect of losing a valuable brand, and the sheer possibility of
such a fate might inspire them to make privacy commitments
and to announce them loudly and unambiguously. At the very
least, the remedy is likely to spur internal company deliberations about core privacy commitments and whether they should
be revealed.
Regulators embracing branded privacy can augment this
notice forcing effect through rules and legal presumptions. For
example, the FTC might announce that it will read privacy policies that are ambiguously or incompletely drafted to provide
the maximum amount of privacy, at least for these purposes. In
essence, this will operate in the spirit of the contract rule that
231
ambiguities are interpreted against the drafter. In such cases, later, clearer company announcements suggesting a lessprivacy-protective policy will be seen as the kind of shift that
subjects a company to the branded-privacy remedy.
Finally, Congress or the FTC might couple branded privacy
with a rule that mandates clear, public, and unambiguous
commitments about important privacy decisions. Think of it as
a mandatory product labeling law for the Internet. Congress
has already required this kind of notice forcing in sectoral privacy laws such as HIPAA and Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, and
the FTC has required clarity in some of its settlement orders
230. See infra Part III.C.3.
231. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981).
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resolving charges of unfair or deceptive trade practices. These
might serve as models for a much more sweeping notice-forcing
rule across industries, as a way to bolster a branded-privacy
rule.
b. Giving Teeth to Privacy by Design
Branded privacy will both support and improve upon a
growing movement in regulatory circles for what is called Pri233
vacy by Design. Associated most closely with Ann Cavoukian,
the Information and Privacy Commissioner for the Province of
Ontario, Privacy by Design encourages companies to revamp
their internal processes to better incorporate good privacy prac234
tices in initial design. Privacy by Design touts seven “foundational principles,” including, for example, “privacy as the de235
fault setting” and “privacy embedded into design.”
The first foundational principle of Privacy by Design is
236
“proactive not reactive; preventative not remedial.” Commissioner Cavoukian’s office elaborates this principle in the following way:
[Privacy by Design (PbD)] anticipates and prevents privacy invasive
events before they happen. PbD does not wait for privacy risks to materialize, nor does it offer remedies for resolving privacy infractions
once they have occurred—it aims to prevent them from occurring. In
237
short, Privacy by Design comes before-the-fact, not after.

Privacy by Design, as currently elaborated, suffers from a
few shortcomings that branded privacy can address. First, Privacy by Design focuses mostly on procedure and not substance.
It says much about the need to revamp engineering design processes in order to push privacy consciousnesses down into the
job descriptions of the working engineers, but it says too little
about what it means by good privacy design. Second, Privacy by
Design relies mostly on voluntary implementation by companies, albeit sometimes with the participation of a regulator,
232. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, F.T.C. Approves Final
Settlement with Facebook (Aug. 10, 2012), www.ftc.gov.opa/2012/08/facebook
.shtm.
233. See Privacy by Design: From Policy to Practice, PRIVACY BY DESIGN
(Sept. 30, 2011), http://privacybydesign.ca/content/uploads/2011/09/pbd-policy
-practice-aug10.pdf.
234. See id. at 1.
235. Ann Cavoukian, The 7 Foundational Principles, PRIVACY BY DESIGN
(Aug.
2009),
http://www.privacybydesign.ca/content/uploads/2009/08/
7foundationalprinciples.pdf (emphasis omitted).
236. Id. (emphasis omitted).
237. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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perhaps through what some have called “regulation by raised
238
eyebrow.” The problem is that even when privacy is baked into a product or service, it can be unraveled easily, so Privacy by
Design should do more to recognize the great temptations companies feel to sacrifice user privacy for profits. Third, although
Privacy by Design touts the importance of transparency, it remains vague about how transparency should be implement239
ed.
Branded privacy addresses every one of these shortcomings, giving a firmer base for the idea. In any implementation
of branded privacy, companies will need to commit themselves
to specific core privacy decisions. Then, once selected, they will
be obligated to publicly list the choices they have made, advancing Privacy by Design’s transparency principle. Most importantly, faced with the risk of losing a valuable brand name,
companies are much more likely to adhere to their initial choices than under a purely voluntary regime.
c. Better Notice: Warning Labels for the Internet
James Grimmelmann notes the “natural affinity between
the privacy law challenges facing Facebook and . . . product
240
safety” law. Building on the work of others, he develops parallels between privacy and product safety, expanding familiar
241
tort principles to online privacy problems.
Most importantly, he wonders whether we might cure some
of the problems with notice-and-choice by borrowing tort law’s
242
encouragement of the use of warning labels. “A good warning
can point out hidden dangers to help a user avoid them or even
243
make an informed decision to avoid the product entirely.”

238. Philip J. Weiser, The Future of Internet Regulation, 43 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 529, 559 (2009) (internal citations omitted). As an example of the way
companies can work with regulators to implement Privacy by Design together,
see Ann Cavoukian & Caroline Winn, Applying Privacy by Design Best Practices to SDG&E’s Smart Pricing Program, SDG&E (Mar. 2012), http://www
.sdge.com/sites/default/files/documents/pbd-sdge_0.pdf, a paper about bringing
the principle to the smart grid jointly authored by the Privacy Commissioner
of Ontario and San Diego Gas and Electric.
239. See Cavoukian, supra note 235 (listing principle six: “visibility and
transparency”).
240. Grimmelmann, supra note 19, at 813.
241. See id. at 814–17.
242. See id. at 821.
243. Id.
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This seems especially important to alert users to unexpected
244
change.
Sudden, unanticipated, invisible changes to data handling
practices bear more-than-passing resemblance to the kind of
harms that we use product safety law to help prevent. According to the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, a
product that injures can subject a producer to liability “because
of inadequate instructions or warnings when the foreseeable
risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or
avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warn245
ings.”
In product safety, warning labels must be placed in conspicuous places, likely to be seen just at the moment the risky
246
Brightly colored labels are often atbehavior commences.
tached directly to the power cord of a hair dryer or toaster, reminding the consumer about the risk of electrocution near water.
What is the power cord of a website? Often the risk to privacy stems directly from the use of a website itself, so the digital warning label should be posted somewhere conspicuous on
the page itself. For this reason, California requires a link with
the words “privacy policy” to appear somewhere on the first
247
webpage visited.
Courts construing online contracts have
gone further, parsing a website into different parts, some more
conspicuous than others. In Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., the court refused to give effect to contract terms
that were revealed only to consumers who knew to scroll down
248
the page before clicking the agreement button. The FTC’s re249
port entitled Dot Com Disclosures provides similar advice.
For some subcategories of online risk, such as the risks
from behavioral, visual (as opposed to purely textual) advertising, the web does have a power-cord equivalent—the ad itself.
In 2010, two advertising industry groups, the Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB) and Network Advertising Initiative
244. See id.
245. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(c) (1998).
246. See Wilson Foods Corp. v. Turner, 460 S.E.2d 532, 533 (Ga. Ct. App.
1995) (“Failure to communicate an adequate warning involves such questions,
as are here at issue, as to location and presentation of the warning.”).
247. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575, 22577 (West 2004).
248. See 306 F.3d 17, 32 (2d Cir. 2002).
249. FED. TRADE COMM'N, DOT COM DISCLOSURES: INFORMATION ABOUT
ONLINE ADVERTISING 5–14 (2000) [hereinafter DOT COM DISCLOSURES], available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/ecommerce/bus41.pdf.
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(NAI) voluntarily agreed to place explanatory icons directly on
targeted ads to warn consumers about the targeting being
250
used.
But most other online interactions lack such an obvious location to place an online warning label. Since no standardized
warning label for the Internet has been embraced, companies
devise their own methods of alerting consumers to change, often by posting open letters or blog posts to their customers full
251
of the doublespeak described earlier. We can do better. We
need to find warning labels for the Internet that are not so susceptible to doublespeak. We need to find a concise, compact
form of information that alerts the consumer to the heightened
risk to privacy, without engendering the kind of confusion and
ambiguity so typically witnessed today.
On the Internet, the trademark itself (whether displayed
as text in the browser’s title bar or designed into the conspicuous logo pasted to the top of every page) sits perhaps on the only place where an effective warning label can appear. No other
place on a website is as likely to be seen and noticed, particularly given recent trends in technology away from desktop computers and toward smart phones and tablet computers, which
means that more users than ever view websites on small
screens. With screen real estate at a premium, many websites
produce scaled-back, mobile versions on which only the most
252
essential information can appear. Large, conspicuous warn253
ing labels are not compatible with this medium.

250. See Press Release, Interactive Advertising Bureau, IAB and NAI Release Technical Specifications for Enhanced Notice to Consumers for Online
Behavioral Advertising (Apr. 14, 2010), http://www.iab.net/about_the_iab/
recent_press_releases/press_release_archive/press_release/pr-041410; cf. DOT
COM DISCLOSURES, supra note 249, at 1 (“In evaluating whether disclosures
are likely to be clear and conspicuous in online ads, advertisers should consider the placement of the disclosure in an ad and its proximity to the relevant
claim.”).
251. See supra Part II.A.3.
252. See Andrea Matwyshyn, Resilience: Building Better Users and Fair
Trade Practices in Information, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 391, 407 (2011) (“The task
of reading multiple cross-referenced linked documents, potentially on a small
mobile device, is limiting, at best. At worst, it is taking advantage of a crippled
user interface.”); FTC FINAL REPORT, supra note 166, at 63–64 (noting the
“small space available for disclosures on mobile screens”).
253. See J. Scott Dutcher, Comment, Caution: This Superman Suit Will
Not Enable You to Fly—Are Consumer Product Warning Labels out of Control?, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 633, 655–56 n.177 (2006) (describing the author’s hunt
for an iPod warning about potential dangers to hearing).
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d. Creating a Market for Privacy
Once we implement branded privacy, we will force companies to make and publicize their privacy commitments and connect those commitments to their brands. This, in turn, will likely push companies to separate themselves into two camps
enacting diametrically opposed strategies, perhaps leaving no
companies sitting in between: Some companies will decide to
compete aggressively on privacy and thus promise robust forms
of privacy at launch. Other companies, deciding that robust
privacy is not for them, will be driven to the other extreme,
crafting privacy policies that leave open the possibility of any
shift whatsoever for all time. Companies will be unlikely to
strike out middle positions, offering some but not too much privacy, because they will lose the public relations benefits of
choosing to be private but also lose the flexibility of choosing to
be anti-private. Companies will know that such a position will
leave them flanked by competitors on both sides with structural
254
market advantages they will not enjoy.
Some might complain about this result, arguing that the
tendency for branded privacy to lead to two and only two distinct types of privacy actors meddles too much with a free market. A rule that tends to push companies into a bimodal distribution along the privacy axis will seem to sap the vitality and
product differentiation that is so important in a healthy market
and also so much a part of the history of the evolution of the Internet.
I see things differently, considering this aspect of branded
255
privacy “a feature, not a bug.” Ever since legal scholars began
taking up the issue of privacy on the Internet, they have bemoaned the fact that individuals never seem to express their
256
privacy preferences in the market. Many have complained
257
that there is no market for privacy. I think part of the prob254. Game theoreticians might model the publication of privacy policies in
pursuit of customers as a “signaling game.” See generally ERIC A. POSNER,
LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 18–27 (2000). The signaling game for privacy seems
ordinarily to lead to a semi-pooled equilibrium, but branded privacy will push
it to a separating equilibrium instead. See generally id. at 19, 25 (distinguishing between semi-pooled and separating equilibriums).
255. Feature, THE JARGON FILE, http://www.jargon.net/jargonfile/f/feature
.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2012).
256. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond Lessig’s Code for Internet Privacy:
Cyberspace Filters, Privacy-Control, and Fair Information Practices, 2000 WIS.
L. REV. 743, 763–71 (2000) (explaining the failure of a market for privacy).
257. E.g., Christopher Soghoian, An End to Privacy Theater: Exposing and
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lem is the murky market for privacy online. Every website
promises privacy yet few deliver. Privacy seems to be a market
for lemons where promises are easy to make and quality is dif258
ficult to inspect. As with all such markets, there seems to be
little incentive to compete for privacy.
But things would change if firms began separating themselves into two separate piles. The full-privacy firms would say,
“use us, we are private,” while the non-privacy firms would argue, “we might not be very private, but look at the services we
offer!” If this happens often enough, consumers might learn to
trust the content and stability of the different signals they are
being sent, and a market for privacy just might emerge as a result.
2. Branded Privacy and Trademark and Brand Theory
Branded privacy also finds support in certain aspects of
trademark and brand theory. Although it might not seem to
mesh well with orthodox, traditional trademark law and theory, when one digs more deeply, one finds a wealth of theories
and scholars who provide support for the idea. In fact, one finds
the very recent emergence of a new set of theories that run
counter to orthodox trademark scholarship, and debates around
branded privacy might help connect theories that until now
have been disconnected.
a. Traditional Trademark Theory and Source Identification
According to traditional trademark theory, producers use
trademarks to convey information about the source of a good or
service. Indeed, many argue that source identification is the only form of communication protected under traditional trade259
mark law. These traditional theories are built almost entirely
Discouraging Corporate Disclosure of User Data to the Government, 12 MINN.
J. L. SCI. & TECH. 191, 236 (2011) (“There is simply no functioning market for
this kind of privacy.”).
258. See Joseph Bonneau & Soren Preibusch, The Privacy Jungle: On the
Market for Data Protection in Social Networks, in ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY 159–60 (Tyler Moore et al. eds., 2010) (“The
market for privacy in social networks also fits the model of a lemons market
well . . . .”); Tony Vila et al., Why We Can’t Be Bothered to Read Privacy Policies: Models of Privacy Economics as a Lemons Market, in ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY 143, 143–44 (L. Jean Camp & Stephen
Lewis eds., 2004). See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”:
Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970)
(discussing the problem of lemons).
259. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.

2013]

953

BRANDING PRIVACY
260

upon a law and economics theory about search costs. The law
protects trademark users from confusingly similar uses by freeriding competitors, because in so doing, it lowers consumer
search costs, incentivizing and justifying investments in quality
261
control, enhancing overall economic efficiency.
Seen through the traditional law and economics lens,
trademark theory provides little support for branded privacy.
My claim is not that consumers become confused during a privacy lurch about the source of the service offered; instead, they
misunderstand the qualities of the service they long ago signed
up to use. In addition, traditional trademark theory and law focuses almost entirely on clashes between competitors—the paradigmatic trademark lawsuit involves a senior user and a latearriving junior user fighting over the collision of their two
marks. Branded privacy focuses instead on a single company’s
abrupt change, whether or not it clashes with the actions of
competitors.
b. Traditional Trademark Theory and Quality Control
Although traditional trademark theory provides little support for branded privacy, well-established pockets of trademark
law doctrine and scholarship directly support the idea that
trademark law should prevent producers from disrupting consumer expectations about the quality they come to expect from
trademarked products and services. Admittedly, these pockets
are sometimes viewed as outliers by scholars, rules that fit
poorly within orthodox trademark theory.
Trademark scholars and judges have long referred to the
262
role trademarks play in guaranteeing consistent quality. The
entire point of trademark law is that consumers will select a
familiarly marked product over one bearing an unfamiliar
mark, calculating that the marked product will promise a consistent baseline of some quality they value, such as taste or du263
rability. This idea has led to the formalized model of “good260. See Beebe, supra note 16, at 624 (“The influence of [the law and economics justification for trademark] is now nearly total. It has been adopted at
the highest levels of American law. No alternative account of trademark doctrine currently exists.”).
261. See Landes & Posner, supra note 185, at 269–70.
262. See, e.g., Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 193
(1985) (“[T]rademarks desirably promote competition and the maintenance of
product quality . . . .”).
263. See MCCARTHY, supra note 200, § 2:4 (“[T]rademarks create an incentive to keep up a good reputation for a predictable quality of goods.”).
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will,” the label given to the positive feelings consumers have for
the products or services sold by a particular company or under
264
a particular brand.
To be clear, most scholars see quality assurance and goodwill as the end states or by-products of trademark law, not as
265
essential qualities the law must bend to ensure. The verb often used to describe the relationship between trademark law
and quality control is “encourage”: “When it works well, trademark law facilitates the workings of modern markets by permitting producers to accurately communicate information
about the quality of their products to buyers, thereby encourag266
ing them to invest in making quality products . . . .” Because
certain uses by competitors of a mark are forbidden, consumers
will begin to expect quality, and not the other way around.
In fact, experts are quick to point out that trademarks are
267
protectable even attached to low-quality goods. More often,
however, the promise of enforceable trademarks and protectable goodwill encourages at least a modicum of quality control
through what some have called the “self-enforcing” nature of
268
trademarks. According to William Landes and Richard Posner, “[t]he benefits of trademarks in reducing consumer search
costs require that the producer of a trademarked good maintain
a consistent quality over time and across consumers. Hence
269
trademark protection encourages expenditures on quality.”
The self-enforcing quality control mechanism no doubt plays a
role in privacy, as companies like Google, Facebook, and Twitter know that consumers associate their brands with particular
270
types of privacy promises. They also know how trademarks
264. See Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of
Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 549–50 (2006).
265. Id. at 556 n.27 (“The point is not that trademark law provides affirmative incentives to improve quality . . . . Trademark simply assures that when a
firm creates a higher quality product . . . it is able to communicate that fact to
consumers.”).
266. Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 413, 414 (2010) (emphasis added).
267. MCCARTHY, supra note 200, § 3:10 (“It is important to note that the
quality function of marks does not mean that marks always signify “high”
quality goods or services—merely that the quality level, whatever it is, will
remain consistent and predictable among all goods or services supplied under
the mark.”).
268. See Landes and Posner, supra note 185, at 270.
269. Id. at 269.
270. See MCCARTHY, supra note 200, § 2:4 (“[G]oods of uniformly poor quality soon disappear from the market. A maker of a shoddy product can only fool
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can punish a company stigmatized (fairly or not) with a reputation for poor privacy practices; they need only look to examples
271
272
273
like Acxiom, NebuAd, or CarrierIQ for that.
This purist’s vision of trademark, which views consistent
quality as a byproduct and not a value directly policed by
trademark law, runs headlong into pockets of trademark doctrine it cannot explain. Several well-established rules penalize
mark holders for failing to maintain particular levels of quality.
A trademark can be lost through abandonment, which happens
when a trademark owner ceases using the mark without intent
274
to resume. Assignment of a trademark “in gross,” meaning
without the associated goodwill, can similarly lead to the loss of
275
trademark rights. Licensors can lose trademark rights when
they fail to supervise the quality control of licensees, sometimes
276
called naked licensing. These rules push companies to work
to maintain consumer associations between trademarks and
277
the quality of their products to retain the benefit of the law.
A related set of cases, which some call the “rebuilt product
278
cases,” use trademark law to force consistent quality. These
cases ask whether a purchaser of a trademarked good can resell
the product using the original brand, despite having made re279
pairs to it. In other words, when are repairs so fundamental
to the quality of the resold product that it would cause confusome of the people some of the time.”).
271. See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Material Vulnerabilities: Data Privacy,
Corporate Information Security, and Securities Regulation, 3 BERKLEY BUS.
L.J. 129, 196–203 (2005) (discussing Acxiom’s business model and security
lapses); Natasha Singer, You for Sale, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2012, at BU1 (profiling Acxiom).
272. See supra Part I.B.2.
273. See Andy Greenberg, Phone ‘Rootkit’ Maker Carrier IQ May Have Violated Wiretap Law in Millions of Cases, FORBES (Nov. 30, 2011, 4:04 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2011/11/30/phone-rootkit-carrier
-iq-may-have-violated-wiretap-law-in-millions-of-cases/.
274. Emergency One, Inc. v. Am. FireEagle, Ltd., 228 F.3d 531, 540 (4th
Cir. 2000).
275. Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927, 930 (2d Cir. 1984).
276. Barcamerica Int’l USA Trust v. Tyfield Importers, Inc., 289 F.3d 589,
595–96 (9th Cir. 2002).
277. Some scholars argue for the abolishment of quality control requirements like these. See Irene Calboli, The Sunset of “Quality Control” in Modern
Trademark Licensing, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 341, 377–78 (2007) (arguing that
changes to market structure threatens modern licensing practices, which, in
turn, have become “fundamental pillar[s] of the economy”).
278. See Heymann, supra note 203, at 423–28.
279. See id. at 423.
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sion to the consumer to allow it to be sold with the original
280
brand? For example, when is a rebuilt luxury watch or a re281
conditioned spark plug so different in its qualities that the
trademark holder deserves a remedy enjoining use of its mark?
Laura Heymann synthesizes these cases into an “essential
282
qualities” test. In some cases, a defendant might “alter[] the
good’s essential qualities such that the trademark . . . can no
283
longer be said to denote the same good.” These cases, although sitting outside the central stream of trademark theory,
284
have a long pedigree.
Professor Heymann provides a useful vocabulary for distinguishing all of these rules from the traditional, sourceidentification rules from which they depart, borrowing from
285
linguistic and philosophical studies of naming. Rules focused
only on source identification recognize and enforce the denota286
tive function of naming. Names “provide a shorthand for an
287
entity that can be used by others as a reference.” Other rules,
like trademark abandonment, protect instead the connotative
288
function of naming. Names “communicate, either directly or
by suggestion, certain characteristics about a person or good,
289
whether actual or aspirational.”
The idea that trademark law recognizes the connotative
function of trademarks and is connected to stability and constancy suggests a conflict with the rise of the pivot and the privacy lurch. When a company uses a single symbol, logo, or
name to refer to a music sharing site one day and a cloud storage site the next, it might no longer deserve the full benefit of
trademark law.
This argument earns support once we consider the strategic tendencies of modern companies. In the past, companies
280. See Cartier, Inc. v. Symbolix, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 2d 354, 355 (S.D.N.Y.
2005).
281. See Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 126 (1947).
282. Heymann, supra note 203, at 425.
283. Id.
284. See id. at 423–28.
285. See id. at 391–93.
286. See id. at 393.
287. Id. at 392.
288. See id.
289. Id. Professor Heymann is not comfortable with rules in trademark law
that seek to protect “nonessential changes” or “emotional connotations” in rebranding. Id. at 386. But, she does not criticize rules focused on connotative
meaning about essential changes. In Part III, I will argue that some privacy
changes should qualify within this meaning of essential.
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would sometimes vary trademarks in order to signal even subtle changes to their consumers, rather than risk losing the
290
goodwill they had so carefully built up. In 1985, a prominent
and successful corporate giant made something like this pitch
to consumers: this Coke tastes different, maybe for the better
and maybe for the worse, not because our quality control
measures have changed, but because it is actually “New Coke,”
291
a different product altogether. We think it is better, and if
you agree, we will probably drop the “New” signifier in a year
or two, but for now, we are hedging our bets in case you disa292
gree and dislike the new offering. This turned out to be a
293
wise calculation.
Today’s companies seem to invert this strategy. Trade294
marks are used to obscure rather than highlight change. Today’s consumer “non-pitch” sounds more like this: this service
is actually quite different from the service you originally signed
up to use, and the changes mostly benefit us and might even
harm you. But if we alerted you to this change, for example by
adding “New” to our brand, we might lose you. By keeping the
old name and old look and feel of the service, companies are
trying to make potentially important changes seem unimportant and unworthy of scrutiny. This is trademark as
smokescreen for change rather than as signifier of quality. This
might stretch trademark law too far.
c. The New Trademark
It might be enough to build support for branded privacy
upon a foundation of the quality control ideas sprinkled
throughout trademark doctrine. If we combine the motivations
behind the rules against assignment in gross and naked licenses with the logic of the rebuilt products cases and with the way
economic theories of trademark tend to encourage stability and
290. E.g., Calboli, supra note 277, at 391 n.300 (discussing Coca-Cola’s illfated and short-lived switch to “New Coke” brand).
291. See id.
292. Aaron Perzanowski provides another example. Starbucks has begun
experimenting with “stealth stores” around Seattle through which they are
experimenting with new business models. They are using different names—for
example 15th Avenue Coffee & Tea—to perform the experiment. Aaron
Perzanowski, Unbranding, Confusion, and Deception, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
1, 14–15 (2010).
293. See Coke Lore: The Real Story of New Coke, COCA-COLA CO., http://
www.thecoca-colacompany.com/heritage/cokelore_newcoke.html (last visited
Nov. 28, 2012) (describing the rise and eventual fall of New Coke).
294. See Heymann, supra note 203, at 423–28.

958

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:907

high quality, and if we tilt our head, just so, as we look at this
Frankensteinian combination, we might see a satisfying theoretical basis for branded privacy. But this would be slightly disingenuous, as most of the strands of theory and doctrine recited
in the previous Subpart are seen as aberrations, waiting to be
295
pruned from trademark law by the shears of time.
It is better instead to confess that branded privacy represents something new, an expansion of traditional thinking
about brands and trademarks, a theory that sits outside
trademark law’s traditional core, a theory about trademarks
(and brands) but not exactly about trademark law. But although this theory may be new, it finds many fellow travelers,
direct support in the work of a number of scholars who have
very recently—only in the past five years—begun to invert the
focus of trademark theory: where most scholars see trademarks
as weapons wielded by senior users against competitors to protect either the interests of consumers or their own intangible
property, a new wave of scholarship casts trademarks instead
as weapons to be wielded against the trademark holders themselves to protect consumer interests. To date, most of these
scholars have failed to draw the connections between one another, to recognize the way they have been launching what I
296
will call “The New Trademark.”
Shahar Dillbary provides a cornerstone of the New Trademark, with his work advocating “intra-brand” policing of
trademarks, going beyond the “inter-brand” policing of tradi297
tional trademark infringement and dilution claims. Dillbary’s
work focuses on how trademarks can function as communica298
tive devices to mislead, deceive, or treat consumers unfairly.
He calls, for example, for an expanded use of false advertising
laws to prevent companies from reformulating their marked
299
goods and services.
Like other New Trademark theorists,
Dillbary does not claim to be writing about trademark law at
295. See Calboli, supra note 277, at 390–407 (making the case that the current “quality control” requirements have failed and will be changed in the future).
296. With apologies to Paul M. Schwartz & William M. Treanor, The New
Privacy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2163 (2003), and Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
297. Dillbary, supra note 193, at 994–97; J. Shahar Dillbary, Trademarks
as a Media for False Advertising, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 327, 328 (2009) [hereinafter Dillbary, False Advertising].
298. Dillbary, False Advertising, supra note 297, at 328.
299. See id. at 364–65.
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all; rather, he is calling for new private causes of action or theories of agency enforcement that let us focus on the special
300
harms associated with intra-brand abuses.
Another New Trademark building block is Aaron
Perzanowski’s article on “unbranding,” the name he uses to describe the act of intentionally abandoning a trademark after a
301
quality control problem. As examples he cites Comcast’s decision to rebrand its consumer-facing service to Xfinity to clean
the slate on its poor consumer service reputation, ValueJet becoming AirTran after a tragic 1996 crash, and Philip Morris’s
rebranding as Altria to ease the stigma the company felt from
302
its history selling cigarettes. Perzanowski argues that the
FTC can, and should, act to prevent deceptive examples of
303
unbranding. A student note in the Harvard Law Review proposed a similar solution, arguing that companies that accumulate negative associations with a mark, badwill, should be required to keep the mark for some time to avoid consumer
304
confusion and harm.
To broaden the New Trademark cohort beyond scholars
trying to police intra-brand uses of trademarks, we can add
others focused on brands more broadly. Deven Desai has criticized traditional trademark approaches as “blinkered and con305
fused,” missing “[t]he noncorporate dimension of branding
[which] involves consumers and communities as stakeholders
306
in brands.” Desai argues that the parallel corporate dimension to branding helps explain many of the last half century’s
expansion of trademark law, but without embracing
noncorporate interests, the “brand theory” of trademark is as307
yet incomplete.
Under his brand-theory approach, Desai would have the
law recognize the “shared value” approach to brand develop308
ment. He connects this argument directly to work by other
scholars in law and media studies chronicling the rise of
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
(2012).
306.
307.
308.

See Dillbary, supra note 193, at 1026.
See Perzanowski, supra note 292, at 10–17.
Id. at 2, 11.
See id. at 45–46.
Note, supra note 17.
Deven R. Desai, From Trademarks to Brands, 64 FLA. L. REV. 981, 981
Id. at 986.
See id. at 1036–37.
See id. at 1042.
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309

antibranding or culture jamming. Desai implies that courts
focused on brand theory should sometimes decline to enjoin uses of brands by consumers and communities in cases that
310
would turn out the other way under traditional approaches.
It is perhaps a small step to use Desai’s brand theory to support intrabrand enforcement of trademarks. We can shape the
kind of healthy brand dialectic Desai desires by cabining the
worst, most deceptive forms of brand redefinition.
What joins the New Trademark scholars is a willingness to
311
look beyond economic theories for support. They build upon,
for example, those theorists who have tried to tie trademark
312
law to a liberal theory account of human autonomy or to free
313
expression.
By looking beyond the bare efficiency frame of law and
economics, we can find further support for the branded privacy
solution. For example, non-economic theories account better for
arguments about power and control. We might begin to see rebranding as a way to equalize power imbalances in society.
This dovetails once again with Professor Heymann’s work on
314
naming, as names are often intertwined with power. In Gen315
esis, God gave Adam the power to name all of the animals.
Throughout history, governments and other powerful entities
have used the power to name as a way to control another class
of individuals, often including persecuted and oppressed classes
316
of people.
I am drawing a line around disparate scholars, some of
whom might disagree with the prescriptions made by others in
the group. In fact, some of these scholars might disagree with
my branded privacy prescription, which in some ways goes further than any of the others. The point is not that these scholars
deserve to be unified as carriers of the same banner or practi309. See generally NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO (2002); Sonia K. Katyal, Stealth
Marketing and Antibranding: The Love That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 58
BUFF. L. REV. 795 (2010).
310. See Desai, supra note 305, at 1029–36.
311. Cf. Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark
Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1844 (2007) (arguing that the history of
trademark law belies a close connection to economic efficiency rationales).
312. See generally Dillbary, supra note 193.
313. See Laura A. Heymann, The Public's Domain in Trademark Law: A
First Amendment Theory of the Consumer, 43 GA. L. REV. 651, 667–97 (2009).
314. See Heymann, supra note 203, at 406–07.
315. Genesis 2:19 (King James).
316. Heymann, supra note 203, at 406, 406 n.98, 407.

2013]

BRANDING PRIVACY

961

tioners of a single theory; this is a looser coalition of scholarship than that. What every one of these theories has in common
is the idea that trademarks sometimes need to be treated as a
two-way street. Because of the information qualities of these
essential marketplace symbols, we need to police the way
trademarks are used by the senior users, as much as we have
policed uses by junior users. These theories seek to take back
from trademark holders, in the name of preventing deception
and other harm, a little of what trademark law has given away
317
for centuries. All of these theories, and branded privacy included, begin to reimagine trademarks, at least a little, as levers to be pulled by litigants and policymakers to serve the goal
of consumer protection.
3. Branded Remedies for Everything?
Some might wonder why rebranding should be limited
merely to privacy policies. Should companies be forced to
choose new brand names whenever they alter any important
policies such as product safety, environmental practices, political contributions, worker treatment, and relationships with totalitarian regimes? In some ways, this echoes Douglas Kysar’s
rebuttal to what he calls the product/process distinction, the
idea that consumers and regulators should legitimately focus
only on information relating to a product (such as consumer
safety or privacy) and not on information relating to the processes that lead to the product (such as treatment of workers),
318
an idea Kysar strongly opposes.
I offer two responses: one pushing back mildly on Kysar’s
argument, or at least arguing that it does not apply to this situation, but the second embracing Kysar’s point wholeheartedly.
Pushing back, it is easier to justify tying a trademark to policy
changes about privacy than it would be to other types of changes. First, as demonstrated repeatedly throughout this article,
the regulation of online privacy has centered entirely on noticeand-choice, and this regulatory history is less well-developed in
other areas. Second, the privacy policies of a company are tied
much more directly than other “process-based” decisions of a
317. See Desai, supra note 305, at 1036 (arguing for a change to trademark
law that “reorients and revives the role of trademarks as true information resources, not simply one-way tools controlled by corporations”).
318. See Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product
Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525,
530–31 (2004).
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company. For an Internet service, levels of privacy often go to
the essence of what the service offers.
But, in truth, I do not think I have identified a unique bond
between brand names and privacy policies. Instead, I am open
to the idea that I have identified a new tool that can be placed
in many different regulatory toolboxes beyond the privacy context. Trademarks are supposed to symbolize stability and quality, and companies too often defeat that goal through strategic
reinvention. When these fits of reinvention lead to significant
risk of harm—as they do during a privacy lurch—it makes
sense to consider putting rebranding remedies on the table.
B. THE DETAILS
Any solution to a privacy problem must compare costs and
benefits. Before we can weigh the benefits of notice (and ultimately privacy) of this solution against the costs of values like
innovation, we need to spell out the variations on this idea that
will define the pros and cons of the balance struck. There are at
least four important variables to consider: (1) which privacy
promises should trigger the requirement for a new brand; (2)
whether or not companies should be allowed to migrate their
users without consent to a new service, which corresponds to
the traditional debate over opt-in and opt-out choice regimes;
(3) what form the new brand should take and how much it
must differ from the parent brand; and (4) how long the new
brand should last. By varying these four properties, different
regulators in different situations will be able to devise very different versions of branded privacy. For the most part, this Article remains agnostic about these choices. Some permutations
will give the regulation more teeth while others will provide a
lighter touch, disrupting market forces less.
1. Which Promises Should Be Bound?
The first and likely most important decision a legislator or
regulator needs to make about branded privacy is to identify
the set of promises that trigger the obligation to shift to a new
319
brand. I have referred repeatedly so far to the “core set of
319. The FTC refers to this as the question of materiality. FED. TRADE
COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE 77
(2010) [hereinafter FTC PRIVACY REPORT], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf (seeking “comment on the types of changes
companies make to their policies and practices and what types of changes they
regard as material”); FTC, ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING, supra note 11,
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320

privacy promises” that trigger the rebranding remedy when
breached, but what belongs on that list? If the list of triggers is
long or full of vaguely defined standards, critics will complain
that the rule unduly burdens market forces. On the other hand,
if the trigger list is too narrowly defined, the benefit to privacy
will be slight.
Along the spectrum from long and overbroad to short and
under-protective, we should be mindful of the novel and aggressive nature of the prescription. Brands are important tools
of consumer protection and markers of accumulated business
goodwill, and we should be hesitant to disrupt them spuriously.
At the same time, these same characteristics of brands explain
why this tool promises such robust privacy protection.
We must also keep in mind the twin goals of this proposal:
improving the information environment around privacy choice
and enhancing stability and predictability for consumers and
companies alike. Both goals would be defeated if we linked a
long and cluttered list of privacy promises to the rebranding
treatment. “Sensible policy would focus on encouraging [companies like] Facebook to make salient a few truly important
facts about how it works, with good contextual help for the
321
rest.”
a. Characteristics for Appropriate Triggers
The appropriate trigger list for the rebranding remedy of
branded privacy will depend on the context, and individual
regulators might promulgate multiple lists for different situations. Before considering specific candidate triggers, it will be
helpful to survey the problem from a higher elevation, enumerating the characteristics of a proper trigger.
In describing these characteristics, I will refer repeatedly
to the Fair Information Practice Principles, or FIPPs, which are
lists of best practices for protecting information privacy promulgated by various government bodies and other organiza322
tions. Every list includes some FIPPs that target privacy
lurches directly. For example, most lists include principles of

at 41 n.73 and accompanying text (defining “material” and “material change”).
320. See supra Part III.A; infra Part III.C.4.
321. Grimmelmann, supra note 19, at 821–22.
322. See Robert Gellman, Fair Information Practices: A Basic History,
BOBGELLMAN.COM 1 (Apr. 25, 2012), http://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg
-FIPShistory.pdf.
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“purpose specification” and “use limitation”
and refer to
breaches of these particular practices as impermissible “sec324
ondary use.” The EU Data Protection Directive prohibits sec325
ondary use without consent. Similar provisions are found in
326
U.S. articulations of the FIPPs. These are a natural starting
place, as scholars and regulators have debated these principles
for more than forty years. Most widely-accepted examples of
good privacy practices are included in some version of the
FIPPs.
Characteristic One: Predictable. Given the aggressive nature of branded privacy, we should opt for predictability. In the
jurisprudence literature on rules versus standards, many have
concluded that rules provide ex ante certainty at the expense of
some ex post fairness, which in turn is better advanced better
327
by standards. In this case, we should tend to select rules, because certainty is paramount; companies should not lose their
brands in response to decisions that they could not have anticipated ahead of time. In other words, the point of branded privacy is to change incentives, not punish misbehavior, and the
rules should be designed with that goal in mind.
Characteristic Two: Connected to Privacy Harm. Not every
FIPP counteracts privacy harm directly. Some act more like
due process rights in data that set the proper environment for
privacy, acting indirectly and prophylatically. For example, a
328
FIPP included on almost every list is the principle of security.
Companies that fail to provide adequate security leave customer data susceptible to falling into the wrong hands through
323. Id. at 4, 6, 9−11, 14−15.
324. FED. TRADE COMM’N, FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICE PRINCIPLES 8
(1998), http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23a.pdf.
325. E.g., Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 137.
326. E.g., FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 319, at 77 (explaining that a
company that decides to treat “consumer data in a materially different matter,” must first “provide prominent disclosures and obtain opt-in consent” or
risk FTC action for unfair and deceptive trade practices); THE WHITE HOUSE,
CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL
ECONOMY (2012) [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE WHITE PAPER], available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf (“If, subsequent
to collection, companies decide to use or disclose personal data for purposes
that are inconsistent with the context in which the data was disclosed, they
must provide heightened measures of Transparency and Individual Choice.”).
327. See, e.g., Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379,
400–15 (1985).
328. Gellman, supra note 322, passim.
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breach or hack. Although this is an important principle, it is too
prophylactic to trigger branded privacy.
In addition, a brand should not be lost simply because a
company tweaks a minor privacy setting. Instead, brand linkage should be made only for those privacy commitments we
consider so essential, so fundamental to privacy, or so likely to
raise significantly the risk of privacy harm that we include it
on the list of choices that affix to a given brand.
Characteristic Three: Measurable. One way to advance the
goals of predictability and certainty is to choose triggers that
are quantifiable and measureable. Many FIPPs can be reduced
to rough metrics. For example, data minimization focuses on
the amount of information stored and the length of time for
329
which it is stored. Use limitation (tied closely to purpose specification) can be tied to number of third parties with which the
data is shared or spread within a single entity of the data. In
both cases, we can test compliance simply by counting things.
A related quality for a good trigger is external
observability. Some privacy practices are very hard to assess
without invasive audits. Security is once again an example.
Others, such as those that relate to how data flows with third
parties outside a company, can sometimes be measured completely externally. For example, in online environments like the
web and cell phones, third-party information often flows
through third-party cookies, which can be observed by the consumer herself, without any participation from the companies
330
being studied.
Characteristic Four: Consistent with Prevailing Regulatory
Traditions. Finally, triggers should be consistent with the prevailing regulatory traditions in a jurisdiction. This is less about
ideal privacy policy and more an acknowledgement of political
reality. Policymakers are much more likely to embrace branded
privacy if they see it as strengthening legacy approaches rather
than extending privacy policy into new areas. Thus, for example, the FIPP of Individual Participation, which provides individuals the right to examine information stored about them
331
and correct incorrect information, is rarely implemented in
329. See Soghoian, supra note 3, at 209–15 (discussing data retention time
limits).
330. See Julia Angwin, The Web's New Gold Mine: Your Secrets, WALL ST.
J., July 30, 2010, at W1.
331. See Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Recommendations of the
Council Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and
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American privacy law. Given this history, it would probably
be asking too much of American regulators to create new and
somewhat foreign substantive rights while at the same time enforcing those rights in this aggressive new way.
b. Which Triggers?
Taking these characteristics into account, three FIPPs
333
seem best able to serve as triggers: Collection Limitation,
Purpose Specification, and Use Limitation. All three involve directly control the flow of information in ways that minimize direct harm and find a long tradition of regulation in the United
334
335
States in laws like HIPAA and Gramm-Leach-Bliley.
All three lend themselves, at least imperfectly, to reduction
to a metric. For example, according to the Use Limitation Principle, as articulated by the OECD, “[p]ersonal data should not
be disclosed, made available, or otherwise used for purposes
other than those specified in accordance with [the Purpose
336
Specification Principle]” without consent.
This translates
roughly to the idea that flows of information should not expand
significantly to new third parties. If a company shares information with five third parties at the time a privacy promise is
first made and at some future time expands to sharing with
five hundred third parties (either suddenly or through a series
of smaller shifts), this breaches the Use Limitation Principle.
Other metrics can measure adherence to the Use Limitation Principle in this rough way. Regulators might trigger
brand reassignment any time a company dramatically increasTransborder Flows of Personal Data, O.E.C.D. DOC. C(80)58 Final (Sept. 23,
1980), reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 422, 422 (1981) [hereinafter OECD Guidelines],
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3746,en_2649_34255_
1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html#recommendation.
332. The exception being the rights extended in the Privacy Act, which applies to “systems of records” held by the government. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006).
The Act provides individuals the right to review and request amendments to
records about themselves. Id.
333. DHS’s FIPP of “Data Minimization,” which differs from Collection
Limitation in some ways, belongs on this list as well. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., 2008-01, PRIVACY POLICY GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM: THE FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICE PRINCIPLES: FRAMEWORK FOR PRIVACY POLICY AT THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (Dec. 29, 2008), http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_policyguide_2008-01.pdf.
334. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
335. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (enacted
in 1999, codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.).
336. OECD Guidelines, supra note 331, at 425.
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es the number of people within a company who can access data,
the number of databases to which a particular set of consumer
data connects, or the length of time data is retained. This by no
means exhausts the possible triggers for branded privacy, but
the metrics discussed so far are likely to be included in most
trigger lists.
Finally, if a company’s new, post-lurch behavior would be
prohibited by another privacy law, this too should trigger rebranding. This should be so even if the conduct is technically
legal under an exception for user consent, because branded privacy assumes that information-quality problems plague opportunities for meaningful consent without better forms of notice.
For example, cable companies embracing NebuAd and Phorm
may have violated the Federal Wiretap Act, despite that law’s
337
exception for the conduct with consent. As another example,
Netflix might have violated the Video Privacy Protection Act
when it released records reflecting the movies its users had
338
rated as part of the “Netflix prize.” In both cases, the compa339
nies relied on strained theories of consent. But because both
cases involved significant privacy lurches that fell within live
prohibitions, regulators might have enforced branded privacy
in either case.
c. One Specific Trigger: The Choice Not to Advertise
Given the organizing goal of predictability, it is probably
not enough to recite the three FIPPs listed above, as the FIPPs
are notoriously vague, jargon-laden, and subject to competing
interpretations. The goal of a regulator promulgating a new
rule of branded privacy should be to define triggers much more
concretely and plainly. For example, rather than announcing
the trigger of “Use Limitation,” a regulator should instead announce that one trigger measures the change in the number of
people inside the company who can access the data.
Another way to make the FIPPs much more concrete is to
create triggers that are tied to commonly encountered scenarios
or purposes. One example seems so commonly a part of the
most worrisome privacy lurches that it deserves specific discussion: a company’s decision to switch for the first time to a behavioral-advertising model. Companies that do not sell user information to advertisers at birth should not be allowed to sell
337. Ohm, Rise and Fall, supra note 6, at 1478–87.
338. Ohm, Broken Promises, supra note 88, at 1720–22.
339. Id.; Ohm, Rise and Fall, supra note 6, at 1485–86.
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user information for this purpose later unless they select a new
brand. This is a fairly straightforward application of the FIPPs
of Purpose Specification and Use Limitation but one given
teeth by branded privacy. Consider a few examples.
When cable broadband providers, like Charter Communications, partnered with NebuAd to begin selling ads based on
customer web-surfing habits, they abandoned decades of past
340
practice in favor of an egregious lurch toward advertising.
Given this dramatic and unprecedented shift, and especially
given the sensitivity of the information Charter was positioned
341
to watch, this service should not have been permitted without
a new brand.
As another example, consider an even older group of incumbents, the nation’s many electrical power companies. These
companies have been building the so-called smart grid, integrating information and communications technology into the
legacy power grid, in order to reveal fine detail about energy
usage in homes and businesses, through technologies like
342
smart meters. Proponents tout the way the smart grid will
revolutionize grid operation, paving the way for significant new
343
efficiencies. They also highlight how the fine-grained detail
they are generating about energy usage in the home will lead to
greater consumer awareness and, ultimately, assist conserva344
tion efforts.
But the smart grid has also given rise to entirely new markets for entrepreneurs who imagine new applications that take
345
advantage of all of this new data about consumer habits. It
seems inevitable that one of these companies will someday soon
propose selling advertising to consumers based on their home
energy usage and patterns of usage, the smart-grid equivalent
to NebuAd. Imagine an ad that says, “We noticed that you still
340. Ohm, Rise and Fall, supra note 6, at 1434–35.
341. Id. at 1434–35, 1444.
342. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 2010 SMART GRID SYSTEM REPORT passim
(2012), available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2010%20Smart%20Grid%
20System%20Report.pdf.
343. NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, A
POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY GRID: ENABLING OUR SECURE
ENERGY FUTURE 25–36 (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/microsites/ostp/nstc-smart-grid-june2011.pdf.
344. Id. at 37–48.
345. Mark Chew, How to Drive Adoption of a Smart Grid Platform: A Look
Inside Trilliant, MIT ENTREPRENEURSHIP REV. (Sept. 6, 2011, 8:31 PM),
http://miter.mit.edu/article/how-drive-adoption-smart-grid-platform-look
-inside-trilliant.
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watch TV on an old cathode-ray tube. Have you thought about
upgrading to a flat panel?” When this happens, regulators (the
state public utilities commissions) should consider this a significant, deeply worrying privacy lurch, and should consider regu346
lating it under a rule of branded privacy.
This suggestion is consistent with the approach taken by
347
the FTC in its 2012 privacy report. In elaborating the types of
“material retroactive changes to privacy representations” that
would trigger a requirement of affirmative, express consent,
the report gives one concrete example: “[A]t a minimum, sharing consumer information with third parties after committing
at the time of collection not to share the data would constitute a
348
material change.” This would cover the switch to behavioral
advertising discussed above, although it is both broader and
narrower.
Regulators should look for recurring scenarios other than
behavioral advertising that should qualify as branded privacy
triggers. To give only two examples, branded privacy might be
tied to decisions to shift private information and behavior to
the public sphere (like Facebook) or to release privately held in349
formation to the public (like AOL in 2006 ).
2. Migrating Users
Branded privacy can take on a weak or strong form, corresponding roughly to opt-out and opt-in privacy regimes. In the
weak form, companies must adopt a new brand name but can
migrate all users from the old service to the new service, albeit
only after giving notice of the move. The problem with the weak
form is the problem with all opt-out regimes: defaults are
sticky, and inaction trumps action, meaning users are likely to
350
go along without complaint.
In the strong form of branded privacy, a company cannot
migrate users but instead must sign up users by requiring an
affirmative action (maybe nothing more than the click of an “I
346. For more on the threat to privacy from the smart grid, see Elias Leake
Quinn, Privacy and the New Energy Infrastructure 4–5 (Ctr. for Energy &
Envtl. Sec., Working Paper No. 09-001, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1370731.
347. See FTC FINAL REPORT, supra note 166, at 57–58.
348. Id. at 58.
349. Ohm, Broken Promises, supra note 88, at 1717–18.
350. See Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1256–69 (1998) (discussing “sticky” and “Teflon” default
rules for cyberspace privacy).
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agree” button) to switch. If a company wants to reinvent itself,
it can, but only by starting from zero and building user trust in
a new brand.
Regulators should probably restrict use of the strong form
to contexts where a strong intervention is necessary. Here
again are principles rather than precise rules: first, lurches involving sensitive information (such as relating to location,
health, education, children, or communications) deserve the
strong form. Second, lurches affecting industries with little-tono true competition should be treated with the strong form of
the rule. Third, sectors that are already subject to privacy regulation deserve strong treatment too.
Some might argue that the weak form of branded privacy
adds nothing to the regulatory toolkit because it is no different
from legacy regulations that mandate notice and opt-out, which
351
many decry as weak. This is a misguided response. Although
the weak form of branded privacy bears resemblance to opt-out
privacy rules, it is a far stronger form of regulation than optout alone.
Weak branded privacy is stronger than unadorned opt-out
for at least two reasons, one focused on the inner-workings of
the company and the other focused on the external visibility
that branded privacy provides. First, companies are unlikely to
rush into privacy lurches if it causes them to lose their brand,
even if they can automatically migrate all of their users.
Branded privacy will stimulate much deeper deliberation within a company than opt-out rules can. In fact, companies that
have invested a significant amount of time and money in their
brand will possibly be more reluctant to move into weak branded privacy than even to an opt-in rule without brand consequences.
Second, the weak form of branded privacy adds significant
visibility to the public. Consumers are unlikely to miss the new
logo greeting them not only the first time they log in after the
switch, but for weeks or months afterwards, according to
352
trademark theory. In addition, privacy watchdogs and regulators will find it easier to discuss the switch with one another
and with consumers, given the convenient label.
Regardless of whether branded privacy is selected in its
strong or weak form, companies should be permitted to contin351. See id.
352. See supra Parts II.C.1−2.
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ue to use the old brand with users who are not subjected to the
new rules. If Facebook wants to create a new service that is
much more public than the original, it can create dual versions
of the service, giving users the choice between switching to
“Facebook World” or staying with “Facebook.”
a. How Much Must the New Brand Differ?
Any branded privacy solution must specify how much the
new brand must differ to comply with the rule. But, once again,
regulators should see fit to vary the answer contextually based
on the seriousness of the privacy lurch problems they are trying
to resolve.
One possibility we should dismiss at the outset is trade353
mark law’s “likelihood of confusion” standard. In other words,
we should not mandate that the new brand must differ so much
from the old brand that consumers no longer will think that the
354
services come from the same source. This would miss the
point of branded privacy entirely. The idea of branded privacy
is not that the consumer must think (incorrectly) that the new
service is produced by a new producer. Rather, the goal is to
ensure that the consumer recognizes that the new service is a
new thing, from a privacy point of view, helping him try to
overcome the information-quality problems he encounters in
most online notice-and-choice situations.
How different must two brands be to provide the sufficient
amount of differentiation? The standard should be something
like “likely to be noticed.” This will turn on the contextual
norms, because names probably vary in different ways in dif355
ferent contexts and maybe even in single contexts over time.
It is likely that consumer surveys—similar to the ones uses to
356
litigate likelihood of confusion —will be useful, but these surveys should ask different questions.

353. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 496 (2d Cir.
1961).
354. See id. at 495–96.
355. See id. at 495 (referencing the contextual variables that determine the
sufficiency of differentiation including: “the strength of . . . [the author’s]
make, the degree of similarity between the two marks, the proximity of the
products, the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap, actual confusion, and the reciprocal of defendant’s good faith in adopting its own mark, the
quality of the defendant’s product, and the sophistication of the buyers”).
356. See, e.g., id. (discussing differentiation evidence used to help establish
likelihood of confusion).
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Given the “likely to be noticed” standard, it seems that
merely increasing a version number should not be enough, at
least not without additional empirical proof that consumers pay
attention to version numbers. Version numbers are rarely used,
at least in any visible way, on the online services focused on
most in this Article. Even in the analogous space of software,
version numbers seem to mean less today than they once did,
357
due in part to rampant version number inflation.
Allowing version numbers for branded privacy might also
invite gaming. If companies can increment version numbers at
will whenever they want (to mark some minor change or perhaps with no change whatsoever), they might do so strategically when branded privacy is not in play, to muddy the salience of
any particular increment. They might train the consumer, in
358
other words, to disregard version increments, meaning the
information-quality benefits of the rule will be lost.
Regardless of the precise formulation, the rule should
probably allow companies to use their prior marks as a component of the new brand. In other words, companies should be al359
lowed to build what trademark law calls a “family of marks.”
Brands are extremely valuable things to many companies, par360
ticularly those associated with online services.
For many
companies, the brand may be the most valuable item on the
361
books. Allowing the new brand to be based on the old one
lessens the burden of branded privacy. This moderates the impact on the market, which likely makes the rule more politically palatable.

357. Frederic Lardinois, Browser Version Numbers Are Now Irrelevant—
And That’s a Good Thing, SILICONFILTER (Aug. 15, 2011), http://siliconfilter
.com/browser-version-numbers-are-now-irrelevant-and-thats-a-good-thing/
(“[T]here is no good reason why an average user should have to worry about
keeping a browser up to date and given the current version number inflation,
these numbers have completely lost their meaning anyway.”).
358. See id. (“There really isn’t any good reason why your average mainstream user should have to worry about which browser version is installed on
a given machine.”).
359. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 200, § 23:61 (discussing the “family of marks
rule”). The treatise gives as a well-known family of marks the marks beginning with “Mc” owned by McDonald’s Corp. Id.
360. See Tim Culpan, Apple Brand Value at $153 Billion Overtakes Google
for Top Spot, BLOOMBERG (May 8, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2011-05-09/apple-brand-value-at-153-billion-overtakes-google-for-topspot.html (stating Apple’s brand value at $153.3 billion and Google’s brand
value at $111.5 billion).
361. See id.
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Companies facing the branded-privacy rule will probably
opt to add a word to its primary brand, think New Coke, Facebook Beacon, or Google Buzz. Ideally, the meaning of the word
or words appended will reflect in some way the change that has
been made, such as “Facebook World” (for a more public version
of the social network service) or “Personal Comcast” (for behavioral-advertising-supported broadband). Whether this is required depends on the goals of the regulator and is not a necessary component of branded privacy. But deceptive marks
should never be allowed, meaning we should never see a
“Google Private” as a rebrand to describe a new, more invasive
362
service.
b. How Long Should the New Brand Last?
The final variable regulators or legislators might vary is
the length of time the company should be required to use the
new brand. We might achieve our policy goals without forcing a
permanent shift. Companies might be given a time period, say
one or two years, during which the new brand must be used
(perhaps in conjunction with the old brand). At the end of the
363
period, the rule might be lifted and the old brand restored.
The theory is that the negative effect of a privacy lurch fades
with time. Privacy lurches disrupt through surprise and by unsettling expectations. After one or two years after a privacy
lurch, users—both new and continuing—will have had time to
adjust to the new rules and privacy watchdogs and regulators
will have had time to have their say.
Sometimes, given the well-documented power of secondary
364
meaning and goodwill accumulation, companies might forego
the chance to return to an old name. The company might decide
that “Facebook Plus” ends up accumulating so much goodwill
that it essentially abandons the bare Facebook name.
C. IMPLEMENTATION
Branded privacy can be implemented in law in at least
three different ways. First, competitors or aggrieved parties
362. Cf. MCCARTHY, supra note 200, § 11:54 (discussing “deceptive and deceptively misdescriptive marks”).
363. Cf. Note, supra note 17, at 1862–63 (suggesting that firms seeking to
change a product’s brand name to escape an accumulated negative reputation—or badwill—be given a period of time during which they must continue
to use the old name).
364. See Landes & Posner, supra note 185, at 270.
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might argue in trademark litigation that a company abandoned
its mark when it shifted its privacy policies, although this theory is likely to be rejected. Second, the FTC might argue that
dramatic shifts in a company’s core privacy commitments represent an unfair and deceptive trade practice unless carried
under a new name. Third, Congress or state governments can
consider enacting new consumer protection or trademark laws
to implement branded privacy.
1. Certification Marks Are Not Enough
Some might argue that branded privacy unnecessarily duplicates the role of certification marks. The Lanham Act and
many state trademark laws allow the protection of marks that
“certify” some quality of an underlying good or service, with
some certifying authority taking on the responsibility of polic365
ing quality. For privacy, several organizations have introduced privacy certification authorities, most notably TRUSTe
366
and BBBOnline. Without delving too deeply into ongoing debates about the efficacy and importance of self-regulatory pri367
vacy efforts, it is enough to say that certification marks do
not have a exemplary track record. TRUSTe, by far the most
prominent of the efforts, switched from a non-profit to a for368
profit model in 2008, and today collects hundreds of thou369
sands of dollars from some of its certified entities, which
casts a shadow on its claims of impartiality.
More to the point, neither TRUSTe nor BBBOnline extend
the kind of sweeping scrutiny of changes made to privacy policies proposed in this Article. And, most fundamentally, a certification logo buried at the bottom of a smartphone screen is a
365. See 15 U.S.C. § 1054 (2006) (permitting registration of collective and
certification marks); id. § 1127 (defining collective and certification marks).
366. See Xinguang Sheng & Lorrie Faith Cranor, An Evaluation of the Effect of U.S. Financial Privacy Legislation Through the Analysis of Privacy Policies, 2 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 943, 948–50 (2006).
367. See generally, e.g., Dennis D. Hirsch, The Law and Policy of Online
Privacy: Regulation, Self-Regulation, or Co-Regulation, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
439 (2011) (discussing the debate over how to protect personal privacy on the
Internet); Ira S. Rubinstein, Privacy and Regulatory Innovation: Moving Beyond Voluntary Codes, 6 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 355 (2011) (same).
368. Saul Hansell, Will the Profit Motive Undermine Trust in Truste?, N.Y.
TIMES BITS BLOG (July 15, 2008, 12:15 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/
2008/07/15/will-profit-motive-undermine-trust-in-truste/.
369. Claire Cain Miller, A Badge That Tells Customers, ‘Trust This App’,
N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Sept. 27, 2010, 4:55 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/
2010/09/27/a-badge-that-tells-consumers-trust-this-app/.
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far less powerful symbol of privacy policy details than a rebranded logo sitting in a place of prominence.
2. Trademark Abandonment
According to McCarthy,
[s]ince a trademark is not only a symbol of origin, but a symbol of a
certain type of goods or services and their level of quality, a sudden
and substantial change in the nature or quality of the goods sold under a mark may so change the nature of the thing symbolized that the
mark becomes fraudulent and/or that the original rights are aban370
doned.

Plaintiffs might try to rely on this kind of reasoning to convince courts to implement branded privacy in trademark litigation. Civil litigants might claim, for example, that Facebook
abandoned its mark when it switched from being a private to a
public service. This theory faces several significant, and probably insurmountable, hurdles.
First, this form of abandonment has rarely been found. The
McCarthy treatise cites only one example, a 1910 case in which
the manufacturer of SOLAR alum baking powder forfeited
trademark rights by selling the mark to another who substitut371
ed phosphate for alum. Courts are unlikely to apply this rule
in privacy lurch cases, perhaps by holding that a shift in privacy, although important, constitutes a minor variation, not a
372
wholesale change.
Second, extending the law of trademark abandonment so
aggressively seems to contradict fundamental trademark theory. Most importantly, the search costs theory holds that consumers will police the qualities of a trademarked product or
373
service that matter. According to Landes and Posner,
consider what happens when a brand’s quality is inconsistent. Because consumers will learn that the trademark does not enable them
to relate their past to future consumption experiences, the branded
product will be like a good without a trademark. The trademark will
not lower search costs, so consumers will be unwilling to pay more for
the branded than for the unbranded good. As a result, the firm will

370. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 200, § 17:24.
371. Id. (citing Indep. Baking Powder Co. v. Boorman, 175 F. 448
(C.C.D.N.J. 1910)).
372. See, e.g., Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co.,
571 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Trademark owners are permitted to make
small changes to their products without abandoning their marks.”).
373. Landes & Posner, supra note 185, at 270.
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not earn a sufficient return on its trademark promotional expendi374
tures to justify making them.

The negative implication of this reasoning is this: after
companies change aspects of their service repeatedly and over a
long time, and enough customers vote with their dollars by remaining with the service for the company to justify its investment in its brand, then the quality of the service being changed
(privacy) is not one that matters to customers for some reason.
There are, of course, responses to this economic argument.
Customers would care, if only companies did not hide their privacy policies behind opaque user interfaces and complex legalese. Or the values of privacy are such that they trump bare
economic efficiency. But whether or not these arguments have
merit in the abstract, they run up against the underpinnings of
trademark law, which are built firmly on an economic efficiency
375
rationale.
Perhaps most devastatingly, the branded-privacy-bytrademark-litigation theory runs aground on the unfavorable
376
mechanics of trademark litigation.
Courts have held that
consumers do not have standing to sue under the Lanham
377
Act. Instead, the consumer protection goals of trademark law
are advanced through competitors using similar marks, the only parties given standing to accuse a company of infringing a
378
trademark. In most privacy-lurch situations, no such competitor will exist. For similar reasons, administrative filings at the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to oppose registration or to request cancellation of a mark are also unlikely to be
379
a useful vehicle for branded privacy. Perhaps litigants could
try to manufacture a case by copying the trademark or trade
dress of a company that has abandoned its privacy commit374. Id.
375. But see supra notes 311–13 and accompanying text (summarizing articles arguing for other theoretical justifications for trademark law).
376. Perzanowski argues that trademark law is not a useful vehicle for protecting consumers from harmful corporate “unbranding,” such as Blackwater’s
decision to rebrand itself Xe, because of “structural limitations” of trademark
law, namely the fact that “[c]onfusing uses of a firm’s own marks are largely
unregulated by trademark doctrine.” Perzanowski, supra note 292, at 27.
377. E.g., Barrus v. Sylvania, 55 F.3d 468, 469 (9th Cir. 1995); Serbin v.
Ziebart Int’l Corp., 11 F.3d 1163, 1173 (3d Cir. 1993); Dovenmuehle v. Gilldorn
Mortg. Midwest Corp., 871 F.2d 697, 700 (7th Cir. 1989); Colligan v. Activities
Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 692–93 (2d Cir. 1971).
378. Barrus, 55 F.3d at 470 (holding that litigants suing under the Lanham
Act must allege either commercial or competitive injury).
379. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 200, §§ 20:7, 20:46.
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ments, inviting a civil suit against itself. The copyist could try
to assert branded privacy, then, as a defense to suit by the
company. This is, of course, a risky strategy exposing the copy380
ist to liability.
3. FTC Power to Police Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices
The FTC might use its section five power to police “unfair
or deceptive acts or practices” to link a brand to a particular
381
level of privacy. This might be the best way to implement
branded privacy because it likely represents a new remedy for
the FTC but not a new substantive rule. As summarized in the
recent FTC privacy report, “[u]nder well-settled FTC case law
and policy, companies must provide prominent disclosures and
obtain opt-in consent before using consumer data in a materially different manner than claimed when the data was collected,
382
posted, or otherwise obtained.”
Thus, in 2004, the FTC investigated alleged privacy violations by the owners of a website used to sell products sold un383
der the “Hooked on Phonics” brand name. The complaint alleged that the company, Gateway Learning, made promises in
privacy policies dating back to 2000 that it did “not sell, rent or
loan any personally identifiable information regarding our consumers with any third party unless we receive a customer’s ex384
plicit consent.” Contravening this promise, the company began “renting” personal information, “including first and last
name, address, phone number, and purchase history,” without
385
first obtaining consent. The company settled the case with
the FTC after entering into a consent agreement that required
386
opt-in consent for sharing data with third parties.
Of even closer applicability, in 2011, the FTC accused Facebook of “deceiv[ing] consumers by telling them they could
keep their information on Facebook private, and then repeated387
ly allowing it to be shared and made public.” Among the
many charges filed in the complaint, the FTC specifically fault380. Congress might consider introducing a new defense for trademark infringement along these lines.
381. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).
382. FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 319, at 77 (footnote omitted).
383. In re Gateway Learning Corp., 138 F.T.C. 443 (2004).
384. Id. at 445 (quoting Gateway Learning’s 2001 Privacy Policy).
385. Id. at 446.
386. Id. at 469.
387. FTC Press Release, supra note 86.
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ed Facebook because, “[i]n December 2009, Facebook changed
its website so certain information that users may have designated as private—such as their Friends List—was made public.
They didn’t warn users that this change was coming, or get
388
their approval in advance.”
Although privacy watchdogs generally lauded the settlement, some argued that it highlighted the somewhat toothless
389
powers given to the agency. The FTC lacks the ability to levy
fines against companies for unfair and deceptive trade practic390
es. And sometimes the agency lacks will, not power. For example, in the Facebook settlement, it declined to order Facebook to roll back the “default public” settings it had thrust on
391
millions of its users without their consent.
The Facebook settlement would have been an excellent test
case for branded privacy. Nothing seems to prohibit the FTC
from treating a trademark itself as a component of a company’s
disclosure, one that can later be part of a remedy for unfair or
392
deceptive trade practices. Going forward, companies should
know that the agency is willing to treat violations in this way.
Companies that cause significant, harmful privacy lurches like
Facebook’s should pay the price with a new name. Perhaps
even more importantly, the threat of branded privacy should
play a notice-forcing rule, by convincing companies to elaborate
their core privacy commitments clearly and unambiguously at
their launch.
Finally, even if the FTC chooses not to so aggressively assert power over a company’s trademarks, it might seek to extract changes to trademarks as an important condition in consent agreements.
4. New Legislation
Although the FTC might be able to implement this change,
in case there is doubt about the agency’s ability and willingness
to do so, Congress and state legislatures might consider implementing the change statutorily instead. Given the pre-existing
388. Id.
389. See, e.g., Grant Gross, Privacy Groups Generally Cheer FTC’s Facebook Settlement, PCWORLD.COM (Nov. 29, 2011, 1:40 PM), http://www
.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/245162/privacy_groups_generally_cheer_ft
cs_facebook_settlement.html (“The FTC’s settlement is as strong as the agency
could achieve.”).
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. See Perzanowski, supra note 292, at 42–46.
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dual federal-state framework for legislating trademarks and
unfair competition, even a state legislature wields substantial
393
power in this space.
Congress might consider, for example, a new law that obligates a company possessing information about users to associate its registered federal trademarks to a core set of privacy
promises. The legislation could even specify a standardized
format for this disclosure, bolstering the notice-forcing function
of branded privacy. When changes are made to these core policies, the law should provide at least concrete FTC jurisdiction
to order the use of a new trademark. If Congress wants to spur
even more enforcement activity, it could offer individual aggrieved consumers a cause of action to pursue this remedy as
well. It probably would not be wise to provide damages in these
cases, but an injunctive remedy and the opportunity for cost
and fee reimbursement would probably do much to bolster the
effect of the law.
In fact, Congress has been provided an excellent immediate
opportunity for this change, as the White House has recently
exhorted it to enact a new comprehensive baseline privacy law
394
implementing its Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights.
Putting the prescription together, Congress could enact a
new law modeled on the following:
A) ENHANCED NOTICE OF MATERIAL CHANGES TO PRIVACY
POLICIES. No entity possessing personal information about any individual shall make a material change to information-handling policies and procedures without giving notice to its users by assigning a
new name to its affected products or services.
(B) DEFINITION. As used in this Part—
(1) “material change to information-handling policies” means any
change that materially affects the risk of significant privacy harm to
any individuals and should be further defined by the FTC as provided
below.
(C) FTC ENFORCEMENT. The Federal Trade Commission is empowered to enforce the provisions of this section and must promulgate
regulations within eighteen months implementing this section.
(D) PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT. Any person aggrieved by a material
change to information-handling policies may bring civil suit to enforce
this section with remedies limited to:
(1) an injunction ordering the use of a new trademark or service
mark;
393. But see WHITE HOUSE WHITE PAPER, supra note 326, at 37–38 (calling
for a new federal statute for consumer privacy that “preempt[s] State laws to
the extent they are inconsistent” with it).
394. Id. at 35–36.
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(2) costs; and
(3) fees.

D. EXAMPLES
1. Revisiting the Three Examples
Let us revisit the three privacy lurches from Part I to see
how branded privacy might have been applied in response to
395
each. The simplest example is the rise of NebuAd and Phorm.
These companies tried to supply broadband cable Internet services with systems that would watch their user’s web-surfing
habits in order to build profiles that could be sold to advertis396
ers.
These new services represented a significant privacy
lurch. In many cases, they would have cut against express
promises made by the cable companies in prior privacy policies,
which prompted some companies to send letters to affected cus397
tomers alerting them to the change.
Under any form of branded privacy, broadband Internet
companies would not be allowed to embrace NebuAd’s or
Phorm’s new business models using their old brand names,
even with user consent. Broadband companies have never mon398
itored users in this way or to this extent. In fact, given the
heavy regulation of the telecommunications industry, this activity was probably already illegal without express consent. For
399
one thing, the FCC’s so-called “CPNI” regulations might prohibit it. And the federal Wiretap Act arguably makes it a felony
400
for companies to engage in this kind of surveillance.
A regime of branded privacy would not prevent companies
like Charter from partnering with companies like NebuAd, but
it would require Charter to launch such a service under a new
name, say “Charter Personal” or “Tailored Charter.” Perhaps
Charter would offer this to customers in competition with plain
395. See supra Part I.B.2.
396. Ohm, Rise and Fall, supra note 6, at 1433–35.
397. Hansell, supra note 164.
398. Ohm, Rise and Fall, supra note 6, at 1429–32 (explaining that providers did not have the technological capacity to conduct such a widespread monitoring scheme until recently).
399. Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Telecommunications Carriers’ Use of Customer Proprietary Network Information and
Other Customer Information, IP-Enabled Services, 22 FCC Rcd. 6927 (2007),
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-07-22A1
.pdf.
400. Ohm, Rise and Fall, supra note 6, at 1478–79; see 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(1)(a) (2006).
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ordinary “Charter” service, using price as a way to differentiate
the products.
This example suggests the need also for the “strong” form
of the brand privacy solution, which requires not only a new
401
name, but also prevents an automatic migration of users.
This model demands opt-in, not opt-out treatment. Given the
long track record of respectful privacy practices, the sensitivity
of the information, and the history of close regulation, broadband providers should be required to convince customers to
switch to their new, rebranded “Personal” versions rather than
be permitted to migrate customers without consent.
In contrast, the two other examples involve companies that
have not historically been subjected to much privacy regulation: Facebook and Google. Would Facebook’s slow lurch from
being strictly private to mostly public have triggered branded
402
privacy? It is fair to say that Facebook is fundamentally a different service today than at the time of its launch in 2004, from
403
a privacy point of view. This evolution can be traced contrac404
tually through the many versions of its privacy policy.
Under the rules of branded privacy, Facebook would have
needed to re-launch at some point as “Facebook World” or
“Facebook Public,” albeit only for a limited time, perhaps a year
or two. This fairly easy case raises two minor complications.
First, because Facebook evolved slowly to its public state, regulators might have found it difficult to isolate the precise moment when it needed to order the use of a new brand. This is
far from being an exact science, however, and even if a regulator cannot tell whether any particular single step taken by Facebook justified the requirement for a new name, it can be sure
that when one compares the present form of Facebook with its
2005 practices, the moment at which Facebook fell under the
burden of branded privacy passed long ago.
Second, Facebook should not have been able to avoid its
rebranding fate by pointing to the fact that it provided privacy
settings its users could toggle to use Facebook in a less-public
way. Privacy settings are notoriously difficult to use, and researchers have shown that users struggle with Facebook’s laby405
rinthine settings in particular. Even though users can opt in401.
402.
403.
404.
405.

See supra Part III.B.2.
See supra Part I.B.3.
See supra Part I.B.3.
See supra Part I.B.3.
See, e.g., MICHELLE MADEJSKI ET AL., COLUMBIA UNIV. COMPUTER
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to better privacy than the default, many will not, so the default
406
setting is what regulators should assess. In this case, the new
default setting would have triggered a new brand requirement.
Finally, this brings us to Google’s March 2012 move tearing down walls separating databases collected from different
407
services. Even though this act represented a significant and
undeniable privacy lurch, Google might not have been forced
under the rules prescribed above to adopt a new name. This is
because even though the March shift apparently shifted
Google’s practices significantly, it may not have contravened
any specific policies, shedding light on the muddled information
quality of corporate pronouncements about privacy and starkly
demonstrating why branded privacy must work hand-in-hand
with new pressure for notice forcing.
At least as far back as 2005, Google’s privacy policy explained that:
We may combine the information you submit under your account with
information from other Google services or third parties in order to
provide you with a better experience and to improve the quality of our
services. For certain services, we may give you the opportunity to opt
408
out of combining such information.

But based upon the events of the past year, it appears that the
409
company’s practices were out of sync with their policies. Can
a pattern of practice give rise to a privacy commitment that
triggers branded privacy, even if express privacy policies allow
different behaviors? In other words, can actions trump contracts for purposes of this rule?

SCI., TECHNICAL REPORT CUCS-010-11, THE FAILURE OF ONLINE SOCIAL
NETWORK PRIVACY SETTINGS 11 (2011), available at https://mice.cs
.columbia.edu/getTechreport.php?techreportID=1459 (describing a study in
which 93.8% of participants revealed some information on Facebook that they
wished to keep private, while 84.6% hid information they wished to share).
406. In Facebook’s case, some of the “default public” choices cannot be
turned off even with privacy settings. Opsahl, supra note 73 (“Certain categories of information such as your name, profile photo, list of friends and pages
you are a fan of, gender, geographic region, and networks you belong to are
considered publicly available to everyone, including Facebook-enhanced applications, and therefore do not have privacy settings.”).
407. See supra Part I.B.1.
408. Privacy Policy, GOOGLE (Oct. 14, 2005), http://www.google.com/
policies/privacy/archive/20051014/ (accessed through Google’s online archive of
its previous privacy policies).
409. Although Google’s privacy policy technically may have allowed for this
breaking down of walls between databases, the 2012 shift is the first time
Google has done so. See supra Part I.B.1.
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If a company explicitly and publicly promises—through
marketing or comments to regulators—more privacy than the
floor set in their contracts, this should give rise to a branded
410
privacy commitment. Because branded privacy is about commitments (and in the case of FTC enforcement, unfair and de411
ceptive trade practices ) rather than binding contracts, it need
not be limited to the words within the four corners of the contract alone.
But even with this gloss, the branded privacy case against
Google is unclear. Although the 2005 privacy policy excerpted
above alerts consumers to the possibility that data might be
combined, we would need to review all of the “more than 70”
412
privacy policies that also existed at the time. Did the contracts for Google Docs and Google Calendar also provide the
same notices?
It is thus unclear whether the FTC or a plaintiff lawsuit
could have forced Google to rebrand due to the March 2012
switch. This speaks once again to the need to couple branded
privacy with some sort of notice-forcing mechanism, be it a new
rule, a piece of legislation, or merely the incentive that comes
from the stated intention by a regulator to enforce a powerful
413
new rule. The fact that Google’s privacy commitments before
this switch were shrouded in a mix of privacy policies, practices, and public statements highlights why branded privacy plus
notice-forcing rules are so needed. Once we implement branded
privacy, companies that try to release confusing signals about
their true designs will stand out from the crowd by their behavior.
2. Examples of Branded Privacy from the Past
If branded privacy had been the rule, a company like
Google might have embraced the idea of selecting a new name
voluntarily. Google could have declared that for one year, their
newly combined services would bear a logo saying “New
Google,” as part of a wide-ranging campaign for public notice.
410. Cf. Hartzog, supra note 10, at 1668–71 (urging courts to take into consideration website design when interpreting online contracts).
411. Susan E. Gindin, Nobody Reads Your Privacy Policy or Online Contract? Lessons Learned and Questions Raised by the FTC’s Action Against
Sears, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 2 (2009) (noting that FTC section
five actions turn not on contract principles but instead on whether acts are unfair and deceptive).
412. Whitten, supra note 5.
413. See supra Part II.B.
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Doing this unilaterally would have signaled to both the public
and regulators that the company intended to go well beyond
what the law required in an effort to put every single customer
on notice.
Consider how often companies have relied voluntarily upon
something like branded privacy in the past. Many companies
have launched new, privacy-invasive services under distinct
brand names, implicitly understanding the way a new brand
can alert people to change. They have done this not because a
law or regulator has asked them to do it, but because their own
internal business incentives suggested they do so.
When Facebook launched its controversial social marketing
414
platform, it called it Beacon. When the company changed user profiles to make it easier for users to access old data—and
most notably old photos—of other users, it called the feature
415
Timeline. In each case, the company implemented the new
feature as an “opt-out” feature, meaning all users were forced
416
to use it by default. Whether this use of the weak form of
branded privacy is sufficiently privacy-protective is not clear,
but the fact that the company has associated so many new
names with their service shows the power of the rule.
Google has also embraced the branded privacy-like strategy, for example, in launching “Buzz” and “Google Plus,” its two
417
highest-profile forays into providing social networks. Google
also launched its email platform under an entirely new name,
418
“Gmail.” Gmail is a fascinating case study, because it shows
how a new name can focus the mind of the consuming public
about incipient privacy risks. And it also serves as a reminder
414. McGeveran, supra note 15, at 1118–21.
415. Samuel W. Lessin, Tell Your Story with Timeline, FACEBOOK BLOG
(Sept. 22, 2011, 12:30 PM), http://www.facebook.com/blog/blog.php?post=
10150289612087131.
416. McGeveran, supra note 15, at 1119; Jill Duffy, 12 Things You Should
Know About Facebook Timeline, PCMAG.COM (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www
.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2393464,00.asp. Timeline is opt-out only in a
rough sense of the word. Users are forced to use it, but diligent users can mark
old posts individually to cause them not to appear in their Timeline. Duffy,
supra.
417. Introducing Google Buzz, GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG (Feb. 9, 2010),
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/02/introducing-google-buzz.html; Introducing the Google+ Project: Real-Life Sharing, Rethought for the Web, GOOGLE
OFFICIAL BLOG (June 28, 2011), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/
introducing-google-project-real-life.html.
418. Google Gets the Message, Launches Gmail, NEWS FROM GOOGLE (Apr.
1,
2004),
http://googlepress.blogspot.com/2004/04/google-gets-messagelaunches-gmail.html.
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of the limits of privacy law, because sometimes the consuming
public, faced with truthful full disclosure about a service’s privacy choices, will nevertheless choose the bad option for privacy, at which point there is often little left for privacy advocates
and regulators to do.
At the initial launch of Gmail, Google weathered a storm of
fierce criticism because the service featured contextual adver419
tising. Ads appear alongside a user’s inbox, tailored to the
420
content of the message being displayed. Privacy activists decried the way Google seemed to be breaching the welldeveloped norms of email, offering a service that complicated
421
the previously bright lines between public and private. Some
422
called for a boycott or a government investigation.
But the storm of criticism did not stick. Users signed up for
423
Gmail accounts by the millions, and criticisms of its contextual advertising seem today to have faded. The lesson product
designers should draw from Gmail is not that contextual advertising of the inbox is not unusually violative of privacy. The
better lesson is that you never have a second chance to make a
first impression. Gmail set (mostly) transparent privacy rules
from birth. Before its developers began enrolling the masses,
they made it well-known that they were changing the status
quo.
Although some critics continue to point to Gmail as an example of how ordinary consumers can sometimes fail to understand the way new services risk individual privacy, I am not
sure I agree. In the landscape of the privacy risks to which consumers have been subjected, I am much less troubled by Gmail
than I am by Google’s March 2012 database consolidation, in
part because the new name and opt-in design of Gmail leaves
me confident that most Gmail users joined the service at least
aware of the privacy risks.
419. Chris Gaither, Google’s E-Mail Strategy Criticized, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2,
2004, at C1.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Gmail Privacy FAQ, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., http://epic.org/
privacy/gmail/faq.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2012) (urging concerned users to
change providers and discussing state legislative proposals).
423. Erick Schonfeld, Gmail Grew 43 Percent Last Year. AOL Mail and
Hotmail Need to Start Worrying, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 14, 2009), http://
techcrunch.com/2009/01/14/gmail-grew-43-percent-last-year-aol-mail-and
-hotmail-need-to-start-worrying/ (estimating Gmail having nearly thirty million users).
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E. WEIGHING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS
1. The Costs
Even if branded privacy would help cure the information
quality problems that plague information privacy, do those
benefits outweigh the costs? Some might object that they do
not, by arguing that branded privacy unnecessarily intrudes on
a free market. On the contrary, this solution seems much more
deferential to the market than other proposals that have been
advanced. For example, some proposals urge a much more
sweeping reworking of contract law, one that might call into
question minor or unimportant terms in privacy policies or
even online contracts with consumers outside the privacy con424
text. My proposal instead restricts itself to a few unusually
important forms of privacy promises, those worthy of being part
of branded privacy’s trigger list, with no effect on promises that
go beyond that list.
This proposal is also more deferential to the market than
proposals that would restrict or severely limit what holders of
data are allowed to do with user information. Under branded
privacy, services can be born non-private, and when they are,
they can remain that way, assuming their creators exercise
meaningful notice and consent and take steps to prevent harmful downstream uses. Twitter, which unlike Facebook was born
425
inherently public, can continue to use its brand without limit.
Another market-focused objection might center on how the
proposal might harm innovation by preventing start-up companies from experimenting with new privacy settings. This brings
426
us back to where we started, to the dynamic benefits of piv427
ots.
This is a serious objection, but one that can be easily addressed. Any implementation of the rule should include a “first
milestone rule,” one that forestalls application of the rule until
a predefined moment in the lifecycle of a service. The first mile428
stone might be a certain number of users, say 10,000. Until a
424. See Hartzog, supra note 10, at 1670–71; Andrea M. Matwyshyn,
Technoconsen(t)sus, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 529, 560–61 (2007).
425. See Skelton, supra note 77.
426. See supra Part I.A.
427. Wortham, supra note 26, at B1.
428. In the final draft of the FTC Privacy Report, released March 26, 2012,
the Commission exempted any company collecting “non-sensitive data from
fewer than 5,000 consumers a year” in order “to address concerns about undue
burdens on small businesses.” FTC FINAL REPORT, supra note 166, at iv, 15.
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service reaches 10,000, the terms of branded privacy are not yet
set. Or the milestone might be defined with a less rigid standard such as the moment when the service goes beyond “friends
and family” or when the service begins taking registrations
from the general public. Other possibilities might tie the first
milestone to venture capital funding, an IPO, or even the “alpha/beta/release” labels that websites already use.
Another objection builds on themes raised in both of the
first two: the proposed remedy might unfairly privilege start-up
ventures over incumbent players. Because the rule is triggered
by change to initial promises, only incumbent players are saddled by its requirements, meaning the proposal disrupts the ordinarily evolution of a market. This objection is the easiest to
rebut, for nothing in the proposal prevents an incumbent from
entering into a market with a privacy-invasive business model.
The rule simply requires the incumbent to give up its old brand
(and maybe its old roster of users) in order to compete in the
new space.
In fact, the rule might produce the happy side-effect of increasing competition. Incumbents will no longer be able to create successful services based primarily on their favorable market share and the inattentiveness of their customers. The rule
will place a thumb on the side of the scale of the upstart new
entrant, but not as a matter of competition policy. Instead, this
approach reflects what economics, psychology and computer
science suggest as a better way to overcome fundamental information-quality problems during times of change. The resulting framework triggers meaningful notice and consent and is
thus likelier to lead to consumer privacy. And lest we feel too
badly for incumbents, we should remember the many other
structural advantages incumbents enjoy, from well-honed efficient processes, to political power, to ready access to vast
amounts of capital. From among a long list of benefits the incumbent enjoys, we are removing only one: exclusive control
over a brand.
2. The Benefits
Branded privacy will impose some costs on dynamic efficiency; are the benefits worth it? Some might argue that they
are not, as branded privacy suffers from the same problems
that plague all notice-and-choice solutions. First, because
branded privacy gives companies the option of selecting zero
privacy, it does too little to protect users from predatory com-
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panies. To this, I must emphasize that branded privacy is
meant as one solution targeting the special problem of the privacy lurch, but it is not meant to preempt other solutions focused on other contexts. Proposals to regulate much more aggressively and thoroughly certain sectors that tend to traffic in
highly sensitive information, for example, should be pursued
and would be complementary, not contradictory, with rules
mandating branded privacy.
The branded privacy remedy is also less powerful if used
too often, as users will become desensitized to this form of no429
tice-and-choice over time. I doubt that users are so easily desensitized, even to frequent brand name changes, because
trademark theory teaches us about the information-signaling
430
power of a logo or trademark. In addition, because mandated
rebranding will occur only for significant privacy shifts, and
given the amount of accumulated capital most companies hold
in their brands, rebranding will probably be a very rare event,
one that privacy advocates will be well-equipped to bring to the
attention of consumers who might not notice the change themselves. The point of branded privacy is not to spawn a crazily
shifting landscape with brand names of prominent services
changing weekly. Instead, and perhaps somewhat ironically,
branded privacy will probably result in stability, because it will
force companies to engage in much more initial internal deliberation about what type of privacy strategy they want to embrace—enabling Privacy by Design—and it will force them to
abandon deceptive bait-and-switch strategies that today seem
far too appealing.
CONCLUSION
Dynamism sometimes comes at a cost. Companies embrace
new business models in order to keep up with competitors and
a rapidly evolving technological landscape. But sometimes they
do it riding on the backs of their customers, converting databases full of personal information into profits, particularly by
shifting to new advertising-based models. This disrupts the expectations of users and contradicts claims of meaningful noticeand-choice.

429. See Grimmelmann, supra note 19, at 812 (“Demanding explicit consent every time information is shared with someone other than its specific,
original audience could require hundreds of prompts, per user, per day.”).
430. See Beebe, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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This Article has presented an aggressive but still middleway proposal: tie a company’s initial privacy practices to its
trademark. Better than a ban on sudden shifts, this remedy
leaves freedom for corporate reinvention and also addresses the
information-quality problems that have plagued earlier proposals based on notice. Better than a do-nothing embrace of
market deference, it envisions an active and important role for
government regulators, and it has the teeth necessary to check
some of the natural excesses the market ordinarily incentivizes.
The benefits are many: companies will think more about
privacy at the outset, choose business models that sacrifice user
privacy more deliberatively and at an earlier stage, announce
their decisions publicly and unambiguously, and think twice
before breaking their promises. Consumers will learn to rely
more on company promises, notice significant changes much
more frequently, and less often find themselves baited by a
good service planning for the day it will become bad. Finally,
privacy advocates and government regulators will have a powerful new tool in their arsenal to combat a commonly recurring
and important information privacy problem.

